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THE MEDICAL TREATMENT HEARSAY EXCEPTION IN 
MARYLAND: A LOW POINT IN CLARITY FOR 
PRACTITIONERS AND PROTECTION FOR UTIGANTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A woman enters the office of her family praclllloner, worried 
about a recurring headache. She fears that her ailment indicates 
the inception of diabetes, high blood pressure, or any number of 
potentially life-threatening illnesses. While she suspects the possibil-
ity of a more serious malady-the treatment of which may require 
medical skill and knowledge exceeding that of a general practi-
tioner-the woman visits her family doctor! for, if nothing else, gui-
dance on the next step to take. 
The family practitioner listens to the patient's difficulties, ques-
tions the patient about their onset,2 and then performs basic tests 
in compliance with accepted medical practice. The results of these 
tests indicate that whatever ails the patient is clearly beyond the 
family practitioner's expertise and medical training. Therefore, the 
family practitioner refers the patient to a specialist3 to receive neces-
1. See Walter Rosser, Doctors Have Their Own Plan Jor Health Care: Family Physicians 
Present Proposals Jor ReJorm in Ontario, LoNDON FREE PRESS, Aug. 29, 1999, at A9, 
available in 1999 WL 25332425; Jerry Adler & Adam Rogers, The New War 
Against Migraines, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 11, 1999, available in 1999 WL 9499226 (ex-
plaining that migraine sufferers go to headache specialists only after first see-
ing their family doctor). 
2. Arguably, these statements would be fully admissible under the hearsay ex-
ception for then existing mental, emotional, or physical conditions. See, e.g., 
MD. R EVID. 5-803(b)(3); FED. R EVID. 803(3). If the patient was not exper-
iencing the headache at the exact moment of expression, however, this hear-
say exception is inapplicable. See, e.g., MD. R EVID. 5-803 (b) (3) (excluding "a 
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed un-
less it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declar-
ant's will"). 
3. Because the family practitioner did not "treat" the patient, that doctor may be 
nothing more than an examining physician under Maryland's medical treat-
ment exception to the rule against hearsay. For a discussion of the reliability 
of statements made to an "examining" physician, see infra notes 109-22 and 
accompanying text. Although these statements can be used to lay the founda-
tion for an expert's opinion or to rehabilitate an impeached witness, a party 
cannot use the family practitioner's testimony as substantive evidence to prove 
the inception, existence, or character of the headaches under current Mary-
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sary treatment.4 
Unfortunately, the patient's recovery may not end there. If the 
patient's ailment resulted from another person's action or negli-
gence, the patient may pursue legal action against the tortfeasor to 
remedy the harm suffered. However, a litigant in the patient's posi-
tion may have difficulty presenting the testimony of the family prac-
titioner because the testimony concerning the patient's pain is 
based on hearsay.5 Yet, the family doctor's testimony can be trust-
worthy and significant in any subsequent litigation.6 
Although generally disfavored,? American courts admit hearsay 
as substantive evidence if such statements fulfill one of the numer-
ous hearsay exceptions.s Hearsay statements meeting the criteria of 
land law. For a discussion of the implications of the treating/examining dis-
tinction, see infra Part III.B. 
4. See, e.g., Ralph Hyatt, Can Managed Care Acromrrwdate Mental Health?, USA To-
DAY MAGAZINE, July 1, 1996, at 43, available in 1996 WL 9716402 (noting that 
general practitioners often calion the expertise of specialists to diagnose and 
treat complex symptoms); Arnold Birenbaum, Managed Care: WiU It Be For Eve-
ryone?, USA TODAY MAGAZINE, July 1, 1996, at 46, available in 1996 WL 9716403 
(explaining that in health maintenance organizations, primary care physicians 
make referrals to specialists when medically necessary). 
5. For a definition of hearsay, see infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
6. While it may be possible for the patient herself to testify as to the onset of the 
pain, the family practitioner's testimony may be useful in subsequent litigation 
if the plaintiff is impeached, relies on the family practitioner's opinion to de-
termine the nature of her ailment, or if her testimony requires corroboration. 
Such testimony may also playa critical role in establishing the plaintiff's com-
pliance with the statute of limitations. Under the discovery rule, the statute of 
limitations for a cause of action in tort begins when the plaintiff knew or rea-
sonably should have known of the inception of the injury. See, e.g., Pof-
fenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d 677, 680 (1981) (establishing 
the discovery rule for all tort causes of action); Edwards v. Demedis, 118 Md. 
App. 541, 553, 703 A.2d 240, 24546 (1997), cert. denied, 349 Md. 234, 707 A.2d 
240 (1998) (affirming the discovery rule in Maryland). Therefore, Maryland 
courts would likely find the preliminary exchange between the family practi-
tioner and the patient relevant when making this determination. 
7. See infra notes 3446 and accompanying text. For a discussion on the desirabil-
ity of hearsay statements made to physicians, in comparison to live court testi-
mony, see infra note 91. 
8. In the federal courts, there are eight forms of non-hearsay, 23 exceptions to 
the rule against hearsay, five hearsay exceptions contingent on the availability 
of the declarant, and a residual hearsay exception. See FED. R EVID. 801 (pro-
viding for statements that are non-hearsay); 803 (enumerating the hearsay ex-
ceptions); 804 (listing instances when hearsay is admissible if the declarant is 
unavailable); 807 (containing the residual hearsay exception). Despite the 
rule against hearsay, the residual hearsay exception allows a court to admit 
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these exceptions do not endanger a court's interests in ensuring the 
trustworthiness of these statements.9 In many jurisdictions,lO includ-
ing Maryland,11 courts admit statements made pursuant to medical 
treatment under a general hearsay exception. However, Maryland 
courts construe this medical treatment hearsay exception narrowly.u 
This limited construction prevents litigants and prosecutors from us-
ing out-of-court statements made to "examining physicians" as sub-
stantive evidence. 13 Therefore, if the court considers the family prac-
titioner described in the opening hypothetical as an examining 
physician, this testimony will not be admitted as substantive evi-
dence, and will not support a finding of liability for the patient 
against an alleged tortfeasor.14 
out-of-court statements to prove a material fact if the statement is more pro-
bative of that fact than other admissible evidence, and the interests of the fed-
eral rules and justice would best be served by admitting the evidence. See FED. 
R EVID. 807. Likewise, Maryland courts have similar provisions for hearsay ex-
ceptions, non-hearsay, and a residual hearsay exception. See MD. R EVID. 5-
802.1 (establishing the admissibility of prior statements by witnesses); 5-803 
(permitting the admission of hearsay statements made by a party opponent 
and 24 other exceptions that apply regardless of the availability of the declar-
ant as a witness, including a residual hearsay exception); 5-804(b) (allowing 
the admission of five forms of hearsay statements contingent on the inability 
of the party to produce the declarant). Some commentators contend, how-
ever, that the number of hearsay exceptions effectively defeats the exclusion-
ary rule's utility. See, e.g., Paul S. Milich, Hearsay Antinomies: The Case for Abolish-
ing the Rure and Starting Over, 71 OR. L. REv. 723, 764 (1992) (" [A]lthough the 
definition of hearsay and the core exclusionary rule have survived virtually in-
tact, the steady growth of exceptions and exemptions have hollowed out the 
rule, leaving a cavity largely occupied by admissible hearsay."). 
9. See infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra note 105 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra Part IlLB and accompanying text. 
12. See generally Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 39-50, 536 A.2d 666, 684-90 (1988) 
(comparing the Maryland and federal approaches to the medical treatment 
hearsay exception). 
13. There are numerous alternatives available through which a skillful litigant may 
nonetheless present the hearsay evidence to the jury. For a discussion of these 
methods and their effect on the utility of the treating/examining physician 
distinction, see infra Part N.A and accompanying text. 
14. A jury's verdict must be supported by substantive evidence to withstand an ap-
pellate challenge. See generally Johnson & Towers Baltimore, Inc. v. Bah-
bington, 264 Md. 724, 728, 288 A.2d 131, 134 (1972) (noting that a jury ver-
dict based on competent evidence "should not be disturbed"); Durant v. 
Perkins State Hosp., 251 Md. 467, 473, 248 A.2d 148, 151 (1968) (concluding 
that where there is legally sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict, the ap-
pellate court will not question its finding); Gray v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 
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While Maryland courts have historically identified physicians 
consulted primarily in preparation for litigation as examining physi-
cians,15 the Court' of Special Appeals of Maryland recently expanded 
the definition of examining physician.16 The court defined a "non-
treating" child abuse specialist as an examining physician, thereby 
excluding the victim's statements to the doctor from evidenceP In 
doing so, the court further (and unnecessarily) complicated and 
contradicted existing Maryland case law.1s 
Due to the various guarantees of trustworthiness accompanying 
statements, to physicians,19 the inconsistency with which Maryland 
courts admit physicians' testimony as substantive evidence,20 and the 
realities of the courtroom,21 Maryland should abandon the examin-
ing and treating physician distinction.22 Rather than distinguishing 
between two arbitrarily drawn categories, Maryland courts should 
admit patients' out-of-court statements to physicians as substantive 
evidence, and allow the fact-finder to determine the declarant's 
credibility.23 In fact, admission of these statements would better ful-
fill the public policy initiatives underlying the medical treatment ~x­
ception to the rule against hearsay. 
To that end, Part II of this Comment examines the legal and 
245 Md. 80, 84, 224 A.2d 879, 881 (1966) (refusing to oveI;turn a jury verdict 
where there was "legally sufficient evidence to support the verdict of the 
jury"). Evidence that a trial court admits for impeachment purposes only will 
not satisfy the elements of a prima facie case. See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 104 
Md. App. 273, 279 (1995) (citations omitted). 
15. See, e.g., Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 277 Md. 120, 126, 353 A.2d 263, 
267 (1976) (concluding that statements made to a psychiatrist for the purpose 
of qualifying him as a witness were in preparation of litigation and the lower 
court properly struck the physician's conclusions because they were based 
solely on the information told to him by the plaintiff); Parker v. State, 189 
Md. 244, 24849, 55 A.2d 784, 786 (1947) (affirming the trial court's exclusion 
of a doctor's testimony regarding a criminal defendant's medical "case his-
tory" relayed to the doctor by the defendant because the defendant was not 
seeking treatment but "creating evidence on his own behalf"). 
16. For a discussion of the traditional definition of examining physician and how 
recent Maryland case law broadened this definition, see infra notes 103-203 
and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 175-203 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 175-203 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 76-85, 103-07 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra Part III.B. 
21. See infra Part IV. 
22. See infra Part V. 
23. See infra Part IV.B. 
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policy principles underlying the rule against hearsay,24 the rationale 
underlying the medical treatment exception,25 and the common-law 
concerns associated with this exception.26 Part III traces, compares, 
and contrasts the medical treatment hearsay exception in the 
United States Supreme Court,27 as well as federaFB and Maryland 
courts.29 Part IV discusses existing practices that address the dangers 
that the examining/treating physician distinction seeks to alleviate.30 
Finally, Part V concludes that Maryland's distinction between exam-
ining and treating physicians is unnecessary given the protections 
afforded by the legal system and Maryland's Rules of Evidence.31 
II. THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES32 
24. See infra Part ILA. 
25. See infra Part II.B. 
26. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. Specifically, this Comment fo-
cuses on Maryland's hearsay exception for statements made in contemplation 
of medical treatment. In this area, the evolution of special provisions for the 
admission of statements by child abuse victims has been a significant vehicle 
for change within the last two decades. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, 
§ 278, at 432 Uohn W. Strong, ed., 5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter "MCCORMICK"]; 
Lynn McLain, Children Are Losing Maryland's 'Tender Years" War, 27 U. BALT. L. 
REv. 21 (1997) (discussing the statutorily provided tender years exception to 
Maryland's rule against hearsay); Lynne E. Radke, Note, Michigan's New Hear-
say Exception: The "Reinstatement" of the Common Law Tender Years Rule, 70 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REv. 377 (1993) (discussing the statutorily provided tender 
years exception to Michigan's rule against hearsay); Krista Mac Nevin Jee, 
Note, Hearsay Exceptions in Child Almse Cases: Have the Courts and Legislatures Re-
ally Considered the ChiUP. 19 WHITTIER L. REv. 559 (1998) (discussing judicial 
and legislative approaches to hearsay in child abuse cases). This Comment 
will not concentrate exclusively on hearsay problems in the area of child 
abuse cases; instead, it will discuss the general provisions and concerns under-
lying the medical treatment hearsay exception and the confusion created by 
recent Maryland case law. Therefore, while it is necessary to discuss specifi-
cally the recent case law that concerns child abuse prosecutions, the discus-
sion and analysis will address all attempts to proffer hearsay statements to ex-
amining physicians, such as in personal injury litigation. 
27. See infra notes 74-102 and accompanying text. 
28. See infra notes 20447 and accompanying text. 
29. See infra notes 103-203 and accompanying text. 
30. See infra notes 248-89 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra notes 290-300 and accompanying text. 
32. For an exhaustive examination of the evolution of hearsay, see 5 JOHN H. WIG-
MORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1364 (Chadburn rev. 1974), 9 SIR WILLIAM 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF THE ENGUSH LAw 214-19 (Methuen & Co. Ltd. & 
Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 3d ed. 1944). 
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A. The General Considerations Governing the Rule Against Hearsay 
To encourage the use of in-court testimony subject to the pen-
alty of peIjury,33 protect a party's ability to examine statements of-
fered as substantive evidence,34 and preserve a party's ability to 
cross-examine witnesses,35 American courts exclude hearsay,36 which 
has been defined as: "out-of-court assertion[s] offered in court for 
the truth of the matter asserted, and thus resting for [their] value 
on the credibility of the out-of-court declarant. "37 Hearsay state-
ments38 also raise concerns about the court's ability to assure the de-
clarant's39 memory,40 perception,41 narration,42 and sincerio/3 of the 
33. For a general discussion of the importance of the oath and personal presence 
of the witness in court to assure the truthfulness of in-court testimony, see 
MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 245, at 374; Wm. Garth Snider, The Linguistic 
Hearsay Rule: A Jurisprudential Too~ 32 GoNZ. L. REv. 331, 338-39 (1996-97). But 
see 5 WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 1362, at 10 (questioning the importance of 
the oath). 
34. See MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 245, at 374-75. Used in conjunction with the 
rules of authentication, courts use the rule against hearsay to prevent a party 
from admitting false or altered evidence for the truth of the matter asserted. 
See, e.g., MD. R EVID. 5-901 to -903 (providing Maryland's requirements for au-
thentication). But see Milich, supra note 8, at 723, 773-74 (arguing that the 
hearsay exceptions provide litigants opportunities to admit falsified evidence 
by tailoring evidence to fall within an exception). 
35. See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 (1974) ("The primary justifi-
cation for the exclusion of hearsay is the lack of any opportunity for the ad-
versary to cros!H!xamine the absent declarant whose out-of-court statement is 
introduced into evidence.") (footnote omitted); MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 
245, at 374-75; 5 WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 1367, at 32 (describing cross-
examination as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of 
the truth"); Snider, supra note 33, at 337-39. But see GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 7.28, at 348 (3d ed. 1996) (noting the 
lack of empirical data indicating the exposition of the hearsay dangers 
through cros!H!xamination). 
36. See generally Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 7, 536 A.2d 666, 669 (noting that 
although there are numerous exceptions to the rule against hearsay, it is a 
"rule of exclusion"). 
37. Id. 6, 536 A.2d at 668 (setting forth "a good working definition of hearsay"); 
accord In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 33, 549 A.2d 27, 33 (1988) (using the 
same terminology as Cassidy and naming it the "classic definition" of hearsay). 
38. See FED. R EVID. 801 (a) (defining a "statement" as "(1) an oral assertion or 
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the 
person as an assertion"); accord MD. R EVID. 5-801(a). 
39. Throughout this Comment, "declarant" will describe an individual who ini-
tially makes a statement and "witness" will refer to an individual attesting to 
the statement in court. See FED. R EVID. 801(b); MD. R EVID. 5-801 (b). For a 
discussion of the parties generally involved in the typical scenario involving 
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statement made. 
hearsay concerns, see Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application 
of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L. REv. 177, 177-79 (1948). 
40. See Morgan, supra note 39, at 188. Here, courts determine whether the witness 
or declarant retained an accurate impression of the perception underlying 
the statement. See MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 245, at 373-74 (discussing the 
factors upon which credibility of testimony depends); Snider, supra note 33, at 
335-36 (pointing out that asking a witness to recall events in great detail is 
often "rife with the possibility of inaccuracy"). A party's ability to cross-
examine is critical to the fact-fInder's determination of the strength of the de-
clarant's memory. See Morgan, supra note 39, at 188 (labeling the "most im-
portant service" of cross-examination as exposing the witness' inability to re-
member details of the subject of the testimony); Snider, supra note 33, at 336 
(noting that subjecting a witness to cross-examination allows the trier of fact 
to determine if the witness' recollection faded or was subconsciously altered). 
41. Here, the key questions are whether the witness perceived what the witness 
described, and whether that witness's perception was accurate. See MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 26, § 245, at 373; Snider, supra note 33, at 335 ("[TJhe hear-
say rule recognizes the inherent faults in man's perception and attempts to 
eliminate the least trustworthy testimonial evidence.") A party's ability to 
cross-examine is essential here as well as carelessness, inadequacy, and other 
detriments to an accurate perception may be exposed. See Morgan, supra note 
39, at 188 (arguing that cross-examination exposes faults in perception and 
memory, more so than any other hearsay dangers). 
42. Courts determine whether the declarant's statement accurately reflects what 
the declarant perceived or sensed. See MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 245, at 
373-74 (noting that it must be determined whether the declarant's language 
conveys the declarant's impressions accurately); Snider, supra note 33, at 336-
37 (explaining that the narration concern exists because words have more 
than one meaning or interpretation). Factors to consider include the declar-
ant's sincerity, the ability of the declarant to convey the message, and the pos-
sibility of an honest mistake. See Snider, supra note 33, at 336-37; Laurence H. 
Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARv. L. REv. 957, 958-61 (1974) (including 
"insincerity" in the testimonial triangle). 
43. For this consideration, the declarant's degree of intention is emphasized. See 
MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 245, at 373-74; Morgan, supra note 39, at 185-88, 
n.19 (discussing the problems associated with the improper use of the English 
language). Cross-examination is vitally important to clarifY problems with the 
declarant's language. See Morgan, supra note 39, at 186-88, n.19 (noting that a 
witness could create a wrong impression through his word choice and that 
cross-examination is necessary to reveal any such deception). Although many 
writers couple this factor with the narration element, this Comment will con-
sider them separately. Both concepts are important to understanding the 
trustworthiness of statements in pursuit of medical treatment. Such statements 
are often made while the declarant is in pain, without the use of certain 
mental and physical faculties, or highly emotional. Therefore, while the de-
clarant may be sincere, the statements nonetheless may be ambiguous. 
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Although it could be argued that all hearsay statements should 
be admitted, and that the credibility of such testimony should be 
determined by the fact-finder,44 the rule against hearsay embodies 
the courts' belief that out-of-court statements are inherently un trust-
worthy.45 Yet, even the common law recognized numerous excep-
tions to .the rule against hearsay.46 Under common law, courts ad-
mitted certain hearsay statements based on their inherent 
trustworthiness47 or necessity,48 if the offeror of the hearsay state-
ment met the burden of demonstrating the statement's admissibil-
ity.49 Aside from necessity,50 reasons for contemporary hearsay excep-
44. See Milich, supra note 8, at 723 (citing 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDI-
CIAL EVIDENCE 53640, 553 (1827»; Margaret Bull Kovera, et al., Jurors' Percep-
tions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REv. 703, 719-22 (1992); Pe-
ter Miene, et ai., Jurur Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 
MINN. L. REv. 683, 693, 695, 699 (1992); Richard F. Rakos & Stephan Lands-
man, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future 
Directions, 76 MINN. L. REv. 655, 664 (1992) (arguing that a fact-finder is capa-
ble of making determinations of credibility). Essentially, this scenario also oc-
curs when a proponent proffers hearsay evidence to the court, and the oppos-
ing party fails to object to its admission. See Morgan, supra note 39, at 183 
(describing the rule against hearsay as a viable protection only for those who 
assert it). However, the jury may only use this evidence "within the bounds of 
reason." Id. (footnote omitted). 
45. See jee, supra note 26, at 563-66 (discussing the courts' belief in the critical im-
portance of the rule against hearsay). But see Milich, supra note 8, at 767-74 
(rejecting each of the historical justifications underlying the rule against hear-
say). 
46. See MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 245, at 375 (arguing that hearsay can often 
be reliable and useful to the fact-finder and that there needs to be "liber-
aliz[ation of] evidence law"). The federal and state courts have imposed their 
specific hearsay exceptions to the rule against hearsay through their respective 
rules of evidence. See FED. R EVID. 801 (d), 803; 804;s 807; MD. R EVID. 5-802.l. 
5-803. 5-804. 
47. Under the common law, courts also considered the declarant's state of mind 
and any motive to fabricate the statement when determining the statement's 
admissibility. See Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 38, 536 A.2d 666, 684 (1988) 
(describing the common law's consideration of the declarant's state of mind a 
"sine qua non for every hearsay exception"). 
48. See Milich, supra note 8, at 726-27 (citing 5 WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 1420-23) 
(noting that necessity applies when the declarant is unavailable and when 
"the need for the evidence arguably outweighs the usual concerns about the 
jury overvaluing hearsay evidence"). However, the author also observes: "As a 
practical matter, most hearsay gets admitted through the many exceptions 
and exemptions." Id. at 727. 
49. See, e.g., Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 7-8, 536 A.2d 666, 669 (1988) (provid-
ing that the burden is on the proponent to show why the evidence should be 
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tions51 range from spontaneity52 to longevity53 to assumptions 
regarding the behavior of public officials. 54 
admitted, not on the opponent to show why it should be rejected). 
50. See, e.g., FED. R EVID. 804(b) (2) (permitting dying declarations as substantive 
evidence); accord MD. R EVID. 5-804(b)(2) (permitting dying declarations only 
"[i]n a prosecution for an offense based upon unlawful homicide, attempted 
homicide, assault with intent to commit a homicide or in any civil action."). 
51. See LILLY, supra note 35, § 7.28, at 348 (noting that the human nature assump-
tions underlying hearsay exceptions are usually those of the courts, not of be-
havioral scientists). 
52. See, e.g., 803 (1) (present sense impression); 803(2) (excited utterances); 
s803(3) (then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition); accord MD. R 
EVID. 5-803 (b) (1) (present sense impression); 5-803 (b) (2) (excited utter-
ances); 5-803 (b) (3) (then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition). 
See also LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE STATE AND FEDERAL, § 803(1).1 (West 
1987) (discussing the history of the present sense impression exception that 
Maryland did not adopt until 1985); § 803(2).1 (describing an excited utter-
ance as one made as a result of an event "which is startling in nature" and 
the requirement that the declarant was under stress at the time of the state-
ment); § 803(3).1 (explaining the then existing mental or emotional condi-
tion exception). 
53. See, e.g., FED. R. EVlD. 803(16) (ancient documents); MD. R. EVID. 5-
803(b) (16) (same); see also Dallas County v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 286 
F.2d 388, 397-98 (5th Cir. 1961) (admitting a 58 year-old newspaper because of 
its trustworthiness as opposed to the uncertainty of testimony that would re-
quire a 58 year-old recollection); Homewood Realty Corp. v. Safe Deposit & 
Trust Co., 160 Md. 457, 473, 154 A. 58, 65 (1931) (finding a deed recorded 
and delivered 40 years prior was trustworthy because of "its antiquity and na-
ture"); McLAIN, supra note 52, § 803(16).1, § 803(16).2 (noting that Maryland, 
like the majority of jurisdictions, does not recognize an exception for ancient 
documents, but only an exception for "ancient deeds"). But see FED. R EVID. 
803(16) (providing a hearsay exception for any document more than 20 years 
old). 
54. See, e.g., FED. R EVID. 803(8) (public records, reports); FED. R EVID. 803(10) 
(absence of public record, entry); MD. R EVID. 5-803(b)(8) (public records, 
reports); MD. R EVID. 5-803(b)(1O) (absence of public record, entry); see also 
United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1335-37 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 827 (1999) (holding that the absence of the registration of a sawed off 
shotgun with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms was admissible 
with proper certification because the database from which it was absent had 
sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness); United States v. Thompson, 420 F.2d 
536, 545 (3d Cir. 1970) (finding no error in admitting an affidavit of an of-
ficer regarding the absence of any relevant entry); Ellsworth v. Sherne Linge-
rie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 612, 495 A.2d 348, 363-64 (1985) (reasoning that the 
public records exception allows the admission of reliable facts); LYNN McLAIN, 
MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE 260-61 (1994) (recognizing that this hearsay ex-
ception "permits proof of the absence of the record to be made by the certifi-
cate of the custodian"). 
246 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 29 
B. The Hearsay Exception for Statements Made in Contemplation of Medi-
cal Treatment 
The exception to the rule against hearsay for statements made 
pursuant to medical treatment55 has four general dimensions. The 
first dimension involves a patient's statements to a doctor regarding 
a present bodily condition.56 To ensure the trustworthiness of such 
statements,57 courts rely on the patient's ability to recall events58 and 
the patient's belief "that the effectiveness of the treatment depends 
on the accuracy of the information provided to the doctor. "59 For 
these statements, there is significant overlap between the medical 
treatment hearsay exception and other recognized hearsay excep-
tions.60 The courts' acceptance of statements included in this di-
55. For example, Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-803 (b) (4) exempts from the rule 
against hearsay: 
Statements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diag-
nosis in contemplation of treatment and describing medical history, 
or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensation, or the inception or 
general character of the cause or external sources thereof insofar as 
reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of 
treatment. 
MD. R EVID. 5-803 (b) (4) . 
56. See MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 277, at 430 (noting such statements are al-
most universally admitted for the truth of the matter asserted). 
57. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 277, at 430. 
58. See MCLAIN, supra note 52, § 803(4).1 (noting that "there are no problems 
with perception or memory" when courts admit statements of then existing 
physical condition). 
59. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 277, at 430; see also Goldstein v. Sklar, 216 A.2d 
298, 305 (Me. 1996) ("All ... declarations made by the patient to the examin-
ing physician as to his present or past symptoms are known by the patient 
who is seeking medical assistance to be required for proper diagnosis and 
treatment and by reason thereof, are viewed as highly reliable and apt to state 
true facts."); see also McLAIN, supra note 52, § 803(4).1 (recognizing that there 
are guarantees of trustworthiness with statements made for purposes of medi-
cal treatment); Jee, supra note 26, at 567 ("Statement[s] made in the course 
of procuring medical services, where the declarant knows that a false state-
ment may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries special guarantees of 
credibility." (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992»). For a discus-
sion of White, see infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text. 
60. For example, an individual sustaining a physical injury during a particularly 
traumatic event may make a statement regarding her medical condition to a 
physician. If the statement was made while under the stress of the event, Ma-
ryland courts will also admit such a statement under the excited utterance ex-
ception. See MD. R EVID. 5-803(b)(2); see also FED. R EVID. 803(2). If the state-
ment described or explained an event during or immediately after its 
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mension is a natural outgrowth of these other hearsay exceptions. 
A second dimension of the medical treatment hearsay excep-
tion concerns statements of medical history.61 The common law 
placed significant restrictions on the use of this evidence,62 but now, 
if relevant, it is admissible to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted.63 Again, courts rely on the patient's self-interest in obtaining 
adequate medical treatment to ensure the statement's 
trustworthiness.64 
The third dimension of the medical treatment hearsay excep-
tion involves statements made to a treating physician concerning 
the cause or external source of a condition.65 While courts rely on 
the declarant's self-interest to ensure trustworthiness,66 many courts 
inquire into the circumstances underlying the assertion, looking for 
occurrence, Maryland courts would admit the statement as substantive evi-
dence under the present sense impression hearsay exception. See MD. R EVID. 
5-803 (b) (1); see also FED. R EVID. 803(1). Furthermore, if the statement relates 
to the declarant's then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition and 
is offered to prove that condition or the declarant's future action, Maryland 
courts will invoke the corresponding hearsay exception. See Md. R Evid. 5-
803(b) (3) (providing a hearsay exception for then existing mental, emotional, 
. or physical condition); see also FED. R EVID. 803(3). 
61. See MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 277, at 430 (observing that the exception 
evolved to include statements made by a patient regarding past symptoms). 
62. See Paul R Rice, The Allure of the Illogic: A Coherent Solution for Rule 703 Requires 
More than Redefining "Facts or Data," 47 MERCER L. REv. 495, 501, 501 n.26 
(1996) (noting that the common law admitted such statements only if "history 
and causation were crucial to the doctors' diagnosis and to an understanding 
of the doctors' treatment" and never for the truth of the matter asserted) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
63. See id. at 502 (discussing federal rule 803(4)'s requirement that the evidence 
be pertinent to the diagnosis of a medical condition and if so, admitted for 
the truth of the matter asserted); see also MD. R EVID. 5-803(b)(4) (allowing 
courts to admit statements describing past symptoms if reasonably pertinent 
to treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment). 
64. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
65. See MD. R EVID. 5-803 (b) (4) (admitting statements that address "the inception 
or general character of the cause or external sources" of the pain); MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 26, § 277, at 430-31 (recognizing that a major issue involving 
the scope of the medical treatment exception is statements made to a doctor 
regarding the cause of the condition). But see State v. Lima, 546 A.2d 770, 774 
(RI. 1988) (excluding a father's statement that the babysitter submerged his 
child in scalding water because the statement was not reasonably related to 
treatment or diagnosis and would be highly prejudicial to the defendant baby-
sitter) . 
66. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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indications of insincerity or improper motive.67 
The last dimension, for which there is far less agreement, in-
cludes statements of past symptoms or medical history made to indi-
viduals other than a treating physician.68 Under the traditional com-
mon law, courts admitted these statements only if they were made 
to a treating physician in pursuit of treatment.69 Common-law courts 
reasoned that statements made to non-treating individuals lacked 
the trustworthiness underlying the exception 70 and that, unlike the 
other three dimensions of the exception, the success of treatment 
did not hinge on such statements to non-treating individuals.71 How-
ever, for several reasons, many modern courts admit statements 
made to any individual in pursuit of treatment,n including state-
ments made to the much maligned examining physician.73 
III. JURISDICTIONAL TREATMENT 
A. The Supreme Court of the United States 
Despite Sixth Amendment14 concerns,75 the Supreme Court pro-
67. See MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 277, at 431 (describing the test for admissibil-
ity to be whether the statements were reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or 
treatment) . 
68. Compare, e.g., infra note 208 with supra note 55. 
69. See MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 278, at 431. 
70. See id. § 277, at 431 (noting that as long as a statement is made by the patient 
to secure treatment, the statement need not be made to a physician to be ad-
missible). 
71. Possible examples of non-treating individuals include physicians consulted in 
preparation of litigation, see infra note 108 and accompanying text; individu-
als consulted merely for examination, see Wilhelm v. State Traffic Safety Comm 'n, 
230 Md. 91, 97, 185 A.2d 715,717 (1962); and individuals who were consulted 
for possible treatment but were subsequently determined to be unnecessary, 
see Rnssello v. Friede~ 243 Md. 234, 24243, 220 A.2d 537, 54142 (1966). 
72. See infra Part m.c and accompanying text. 
73. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. 
74. The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides, in pertinent part: "In 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Four-
teenth Amendment extends such protections to state proceedings. See Davis v. 
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) (holding that Alaska's statute protecting ano-
nymity of juvenile offenders effectively denied the petitioner his right to con-
front witnesses under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments); Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-05 (1965) (holding that the Sixth Amendment's right 
to confront witnesses is a fundamental right and is thus obligatory to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
75. See generally Bomjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987) ("While a lit-
eral interpretation of the Confrontation Clause could bar the use of any out-
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tects the courts' ability to admit trustworthy hearsay evidence.76 Al-
though the Court in Ohio v. Roberts77 restricted the ability of a court 
to admit hearsay statements from prior proceedings,18 it nonetheless 
found no infringement of the Sixth Amendment by admitting state-
ments made under "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions.79 In Roberts, 
the State, seeking a conviction for check forgery and possession of 
stolen credit cards, sought to admit a declarapt's prior testimony 
against the petitioner.80 The Court held that the State normally had 
to show the unavailability of the declarant and an "adequate 'indi-
cia of reliability.' "81 However, the Court concluded that "[r] eliability 
can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls 
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. "82 A firmly rooted excep-
of -court statements when the declarant is unavailable, this Court has rejected 
that view as 'unintended and too extreme.'" (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
u.s. 56, 63 (1980»; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) 
(" [T]here could be nothing more directly contrary to the letter of the provi-
sion in question than the admission of dying declarations."). 
76. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (rejecting the argument that 
the Sixth Amendment requires the exclusion of all hearsay as it is too ex-
treme); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847-48 (1990) ("[T]he [Con-
frontation] Clause permits, where necessary, the admission of certain hearsay 
statements against a defendant despite the defendant's inability to confront 
the declarant at trial."). 
77. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
78. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-14 (1972) (dealing with the admission 
of prior testimony under a hearsay exception) (citing California v. Green, 399 
U.S. 149, 149-70 (1970»; Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 314-15 (1968) (per 
curium); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 719-25 (1968). 
79. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (concluding that when a hearsay declarant is not pres-
ent, the Confrontation Clause requires a showing that he is unavailable and 
that his statement is reliable). 
80. See id. at 59-60 (laying out the underlying facts of the state's charges against 
the petitioner). The declarant testified at a preliminary hearing that, despite 
the claims of the petitioner, she had not given him permission to use her 
credit cards or checks. See id. at 58 (pointing out the declarant was the only 
witness at the preliminary hearing). The trial court could not ascertain the lo-
cation of the declarant at the time of the trial and her mother testified that 
she was unaware of her whereabouts. See id. at 59 (noting that five subpoenas 
were issued to. the declarant's last known address). 
81. [d. at 66. 
82. [d. Statements not falling under a firmly rooted hearsay exception may none-
theless be admitted if there are" 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' 
drawn from the 'totality of the circumstances ... that surround the making of 
the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief.'" 
Carol A. Chase, Confronting Supreme Confusion: Balancing Defendants' Confronta-
tion Clause Rights Against the Need to Protect Child Abuse Victims, 1993 UTAH L. 
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tion allows proponents of hearsay statements to present such evi-
dence without showing the unavailability of the declarant.83 
However, subsequent Supreme Court decisions created some 
confusion as to the applicability of the Roberts test. In United States v. 
Inadi,84 the Court seemed to abandon the Roberts test, focusing ex-
clusively on the trustworthiness of the statement.85 Distinguishing 
the statements in Robert/'6 from those in Inadi, the Court found lit-
de utility in determining the availability of the declarant.87 Although 
REv. 407, 411 (1993) (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 u.s. 805, 819-20 (1990) 
(holding that admission of a child's hearsay statements violated the defend-
ant's confrontation clause rights». For a discussion of what constitutes a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception, see Wright, 497 u.s. at 817 ("Admission 
under a firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfies the constitutional require-
ment of reliability because of the weight accorded longstanding judicial and 
legislative experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain types of out-
of -court statements."); Myrna S. Raeder, Whites Effect on the Right to Confront 
Ones Accuser, 7 CRIM. JUST. 2, 53-56 (1993) (questioning whether any federal 
hearsay exception would ever not be considered a firmly rooted exception); 
Nancy H. Baughan, Recent Development, White v. Illinois: The Confrontation 
Clause and the Supreme Court's Preference for Out-of Court Statements, 46 V AND. L. 
REv. 235, 261-62 (1993) (questioning whether the Court has ever defined 
"firmly rooted"). 
83. Although there was some confusion concerning this result, subsequent case 
law affirmed this conclusion. See infra note 84-89 and accompanying text. 
84. 475 U.S. 387 (1986). During the prosecution for conspiracy to manufacture 
and distribute methamphetamines, the State sought to introduce lawfully ob-
tained taped admissions of co-conspirators. See id. at 387-90. 
85. See id. at 393-95. This development is especially remarkable given the require-
ments that must be satisfied by the proponents to use the co-conspirator hear-
say statements as substantive evidence. See, e.g., FED. R EVID. 801 (d)(2) (E) (re-
quiring a showing that the declarant is unavailable and that the statement was 
made by a co-conspirator during, and in furtherance of, the conspiracy); MD. 
R EvID. 5-803(a)(5). 
86. Although the Roberts Court characterized the co-conspirator's prior testimony 
as a "weaker substitute" for live testimony, the Inadi court concluded that a 
co-conspirator's statement, made to another while the conspiracy was in pro-
cess, would "derive its significance from the circumstances in which it was 
made." Inadi, 475 u.s. at 395. According to the Inadi Court, the evidentiary 
significance of the co-conspirator's statements would decrease, notwithstand-
ing the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, if the prosecutor 
called the co-conspirator to the stand to testify to the assertion. See id. at 396. 
"Even when the declarant takes the stand, his in-court testimony seldom will 
reproduce a significant portion of the evidentiary value of his statements dur-
ing the course of the conspiracy." Id. 
87. See id. at 396-400. But see Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (requiring a showing of un-
availability and reliability for a hearsay statement to be admissible). Among 
the proposal's flaws, the Court illuminated the lack of contribution to the 
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the Court placed some restrictions on the use of hearsay evidence,88 
this departure from Roberts opened the doors to the Court's deci-
sion in White v. Illinois.89 
In White,90 the Court specifically categorized statements made 
for the purpose of receiving medical treatment as embodied in a 
firmly rooted exception to the rule against hearsay.91 Citing the 
trustworthiness inherent in such statements,92 the Court emphasized 
truth-finding process, lack of meaningful exclusion, availability of viable alter-
natives (such as the defendant compelling an available declarant to testifY at 
trial through subpoena), and the practical, yet unnecessary burden such a re-
quirement places on the prosecution. See Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394-400 (holding 
that the Confrontation Clause does not embody an unavailability rule). 
88. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (holding the admission of a child's 
hearsay statements violated the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights). 
Convicted of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of 16 years, the 
defendant contended that the trial court's admission of out-of-court state-
ments made by the child to a doctor during an examination violated the Con-
frontation Clause. See id. at 812-13. Relying on Idaho's residual hearsayexcep-
tion, the trial court admitted the doctor's testimony that the victim said: 
"Daddy does this with me, but he does it a lot more with my sister than with 
me." Id. at 811. Affirming the reversal of the respondent's conviction and con-
cluding that the residual hearsay exception was not firmly rooted, the Court 
sought sufficient indicia of reliability to overcome the Confrontation Clause's 
provisions. See id. at 813, 817 (reasoning that the child's statements were not 
automatically considered reliable because the residual hearsay exception was 
not "firmly rooted"). The question of the witness's availability went unad-
dressed by the Court, however. See id. at 816. At trial, the defense counsel con-
ceded that the victim was incapable of communicating with the jury and 
failed to preserve this issue for review. See id. (assuming, without deciding, 
that the younger daughter was an unavailable witness because the lower court 
never discussed it or said otherwise). 
89. 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
90. Appealing his convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault, residential 
burglary, and unlawful restraint, the petitioner contested the trial court's ad-
mission of hearsay statements by the four year old declarant through the testi-
mony of her treating physician and attending nurse. See White, 502 U.S. at 349-
50. The trial court admitted the statements under Illinois's hearsay exception 
for statements to medical personnel for diagnosis or treatment. See id. at 350-
51. 
91. See id. at 357 (concluding that the evidence was admitted under a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception and refusing to look for any guarantees of trustwor-
thiness); if. Wright, 497 U.S. at 817 (concluding that Idaho's residual hearsay 
exception was not firmly rooted and seeking particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness) . 
92. According to the Court: 
The rationale for permitting hearsay testimony regarding spontane-
ous declarations and statements made in the course of receiving 
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that such hearsay statements had "special guarantees of credibility 
that a trier of fact may not think replicated by courtroom testi-
mony."93 Contrasting the trustworthiness of such assertions to those 
involved in Roberts,94 the Court concluded that the admission of 
such statements would not violate the Sixth Amendment, and af-
firmed its ruling in Roberts.95 The Court reasoned that the trustwor-
thiness of statements that fall within firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tions did not depend on the availability of the declarant.96 As a 
result, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the declar-
ant must be present for admission of the hearsay statement,97 
thereby allowing a party to introduce such a hearsay statement even 
when the declarant is available.98 
Therefore, while .the Supreme Court discussed the constitu-
tional complications posed by exceptions to the rule against hear-
say,99 it deferred to the state courts to define the dimensions of 
those exceptions.1OO Absent federal court jurisdiction,101 it is a state's 
medical care is that such out-of-court declarations are made in con-
texts that provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness. But 
those same factors that contribute to the statements' reliability can-
not be recaptured even by later in-court testimony. A statement that 
has been offered in a moment of excitement - without the opportu-
nity to reflect on the consequences of one's exclamation - may justi-
fiably carry more weight with a trier of fact than a similar statement 
offered in the relative calm of the courtroom. Similarly, a statement 
made in the course of procuring medical services, where the declar-
ant knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreat-
ment, carries special guarantees of credibility that a trier of fact may 
not think replicated by courtroom testimony. 
White, 502 U.S. at 355-56 (footnote omitted). 
93. [d. at 356. In making this determination, the Court also discussed the gen-
eral acceptance of this hearsay exception in many state jurisdictions in the 
United States. See id. at 355 n.B (observing that the exception is recognized in 
nearly four-fifths of the States). 
94. See id. at 356. 
95. See id. at 356-57. 
96. See id. at 357. 
97. See id. at 354 (reiterating that there is "little benefit, if any, to be accom-
plished by imposing an 'unavailability rule' "). 
98. See id. 
99. See supra notes 74-98 and accompanying text. 
100. See infra note 105. 
101. See, e.g., United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368 (1980) (looking to the 
House Conference Committee Report on the Federal Rules of Evidence to 
conclude that federal privilege law must be applied in criminal cases in fed-
eral court and parenthetically explaining "the admissibility of evidence in 
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rules of evidence that govern the admissibility of hearsay 
statements.102 
B. Evolution of the Maryland Medical Treatment Hearsay Exception 
Maryland has long recognized the trustworthiness of statements 
made to a physician pursuant to treatment,103 notwithstanding hear-
say dangers. 104 In accord with much of the country,105 Maryland 
criminal trials in the federal courts 'is to be controlled by common law princi-
ples, not by local statute' ") (quoting Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 13 
(1934»; England v. Reinauer Transp. Cos., 194 F.3d 265, 273 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence determine the evidentiary aspects 
of the collateral source rule of cases heard in federal court). 
102. See MD. R EVlD. 5-101(a) (providing that the Maryland rules of evidence apply 
to all actions and proceedings in state courts unless otherwise provided); At-
torney Grievance Comm'n v. Sabghir, 350 Md. 67, 76, 710 A.2d 926, 931 
(1998) (mentioning that attorney disciplinary proceedings are not exempted 
from the rules of evidence); Key-EL v. State, 349 Md. 811, 816, 709 A.2d 1305, 
1307 (1998) (noting that, in its order adopting the rules of evidence, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland provided that the rules would govern all ac-
tions); Graves v. State, 334 Md. 30, 36-37 n.2, 637 A.2d 1197, 1201 n.2 (1994) 
(recognizing that after the rules of evidence took effect, they were to apply to 
all trials and hearings); Walker v. State, 107 Md. App. 502, 518, 668 A.2d 990, 
998 (1995) ("Maryland's codified rules of evidence were made applicable to 
'all actions and proceedings in the courts of this State' with some exceptions." 
(quoting MD. R EVlD. 5-101», a/I'd, 345 Md. 293, 691 A.2d 1341 (1996). 
103. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
104. See Adams v. Benson, 208 Md. 261, 266-67, 117 A.2d 881, 883 (1955) (restating 
the longstanding rule that an "attending physician may testify not only to 
facts observed about the condition of an injured patient but also to state-
ments made by the patient about his symptoms and feelings during examina-
tions made with a view to treatment") (discussing Sellman v. Wheeler, 95 Md. 
751, 54 A. 512, 514 (1902». 
105. While most states have hearsay exceptions concerning information relayed to 
medical professionals, very few differ from the language of the federal rule: 
"Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and 
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, 
or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof 
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." FED. R EVID. 
803(4). Twenty seven states have adopted the language of the federal rule ver-
batim. See ALA. R EVID. 803(4) (explaining in the Committee Notes that, 
"Rule 803(4) supersedes prior Alabama authority to the effect that a physician 
could not relate statements made during a consultation held solely for the 
purpose of enabling the physician to testify"); ALAsKA R EVlD. 803 (4), con-
strued in Smiley v. State, No. A-6130, 1998 WL 90897, at *3 n.1 (Alaska App. 
March 4, 1998) (unpublished) (holding that the motive of the declarant must 
coincide with the rationale behind Rule 803(4)-the declarant's statements 
must be motivated by the need to give truthful information in furtherance of 
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diagnosis or treatment); ARIz. R EVID. 803(4), reviewed by State v. Robinson, 
735 P.2d 801, 809 (Ariz. 1987) (explaining the rationales behind both the fed-
eral rule and the Arizona rule as identical); ARK. R EVID. 803(4), analyzed in 
Collins v. Hinton, 937 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Ark. 1997) (determining that testi-
mony given by either a treating or examining physician regarding medical 
treatment or diagnosis is admissible); COLO. R EVID. 803(4), reviewed in People 
v. King, 765 P.2d 608, 609 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the declarant's 
motive in making the statements to a non-treating physician must be consis-
tent with the rationale of the rule before they may be admitted); CONN. R 
EVID. 803(4), construed in George v. Ericson, 736 A.2d 889, 896 (Conn. 1999) 
(holding that treating physicians and physicians retained for trial may testify); 
DEL R EVID. 803(4) (stating that "Rule 803(4) ... tracks F.RE." in the histor-
ical notes); HAw. R EVID. 803 (b) (4) (providing that, "[t]his exception, which 
is identical with FED. R EVID. 803(4), liberalizes the common law rule that ad-
mitted only statements made for the purpose of medical treatment" in the 
commentary accompanying the rule); IND. R EVID. 803(4), construed in Mc-
Clain v. State, 675 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind. 1996) (holding that the declarant's 
motivation for seeking diagnosis or treatment must coincide with the rule's ra-
tionale); IOWA R EVID. 803(4), reviewed in State v. Tracy, 482 N.W.2d 675, 681 
(Iowa 1992) (providing that the declarant's motive must be consistent with 
the rationale of Rule 803(4), thereby alleviating the risk of untruthful state-
ments); Ky. R EvlD. 803(4), explained in Drumm v. Commonwealth, 783 S.W.2d 
380, 384-85 (Ky. 1990) (adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), thereby 
eliminating the distinction between examining and treating physicians); ME. 
R EVID. 803(4) (adopting the federal rule's language verbatim); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. R EVID. 803(4) (adding that there is no longer a distinction between 
treating and examining physicians in the advisory committee notes); MONT. R 
EVID. 803(4) (adopting the federal rule verbatim), construed in State v. Arling-
ton, 875 P.2d 307, 316 (Mont. 1994) (holding that the motive of the declarant 
in making the statement must be to seek medical treatment); NEB. REv. STAT. 
§ 27-803(3) (adopting the federal rule verbatim), explained in Vacanti v. Mas-
ters Elecs. Corp., 514 N.W.2d 319, 324 (Neb. 1994) ("At the heart of this hear-
say exception lies statements made by a patient to a treating physician."); NEV. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 51.115, reviewed in Felix v. State, 849 P.2d 220, 249 (Nev. 
1993) (deciding that the statements must be necessary for treatment or diag-
nosis, and not made for investigation purposes); N.M. R EVID. 11-803(D), ana-
lyzed in In re Esperanza M., 955 P.2d 204, 207"{)8 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (consid-
ering it immaterial whether an examination was part of an investigation, as 
long as it was for diagnosis and treatment); N.C. GEN. STAT. R EVID. 803(4), ex-
plained in State v. Stafford, 346 S.E.2d. 463, 467 (N.C. 1986) (holding that if 
the sale purpose of the physician's examimltion is for testimony at trial, state-
ments made by the declarant are inadmissible because they lack reliability); 
N.D. R EVID. 803(4) (detailing in the explanatory note accompanying the 
state rules that the rules were adopted from the federal rules); OHIO R EVID. 
803(4) (observing that the rule "extends the common law doctrine to admit 
statements made to a physician without regard to the purpose of the examina-
tion or need for the patient's history" in the accompanying commentary); OR. 
REv. STAT. R EVID. 803(4), analyzed in State v. Logan, 806 P.2d 137, 139 (Or. 
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Ct. App. 1991) (pointing out that the rule is based on the belief that the 
statements will be truthful and reliable when a patient is seeking diagnosis or 
treatment); TEX. R EVID. 803(4), explained in Syndex Corp. v. Dean, 820 S.W.2d 
869, 873 (Tex. App. 1991) (providing that the statements do not have to be 
made to a physician, so long as they are made for medical treatment); UTAH 
R EVID. 803(4), explained in Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 256 (Utah 1998) 
(characterizing this exception as "the 'treating physician' exception"); WASH. 
R. EVID. 803(a)(4) (providing that "[s]tatements made to a treating or non-
treating physician . . . [may be admitted] for the purpose of proving the 
truth of the matter asserted" in the accompanying commentary); W. VA. R 
EVID. 803(4), reviewed in State v. Edward, 398 S.E.2d 123, 136 (W. Va. 1990) 
('" [T]he declarant's motive in making the statement must be consistent with 
the purposes of promoting treatment.'''); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 908.03(4) (1999), 
explained in Thompson v. Nee, 107 N.W.2d 150, 152 (Wis. 1961) (forbidding 
admission of statements made to a doctor solely employed for testimony); 
WYO. R EvlD. 803(4) (adopting verbatim the language of the federal rule with-
out any commentary as to whether a distinction is made between an examin-
ing or treating physician). 
Additionally, while not adopting the language of Federal Rule 803(4) verba-
tim, 10 states have adopted the spirit of the Federal Rule. See F1A. STAT. ANN. § 
90.803(4) (admitting "[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment by a person seeking the diagnosis ar treatment, ar made by an individual 
who has knowledge of the facts and is legally responsible far the person who is unable to 
communicate the facts, which statements describe medical history") (emphasis ad-
ded); GA. R EVID. CODE § 24-34 (permitting that statements made, "as reason-
ably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment shall be admissible in evidence") (em-
phasis added); IDAHO R EVID. 803(4) (adopting the text of Federal Rule 
803(4), but omitting the phrase, "or the inception or general character of the 
cause or external"), construed in State v. Moore, 965 P.2d 174, 182-83 (Idaho 
1998) (holding that examining as well as treating physicians may testify); MISS. 
R EVID. 803(4) (permitting the admission of statements made: "insofar as rea-
sonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, regardless of to whom the statements 
a111 made, ar when the statements are made, if the court, in its discretion, affirmatively 
finds that the proffered statements were made under circumstances substantially indicat-
ing their trustworthiness" and defining the term 'medical" to include "emo-
tional and mental health as well as physical health") (emphasis added); N.H. 
R EVID. 803(4) (adopting the test of Federal Rule 803(3) and adding that the 
statement may be admitted, "regardless of to whom the statements are made, ar 
when the statements are made, if a court, in its discretion, affirmatively finds that the 
proffered statements were made under circumstances indicating their trustworthiness") 
(emphasis added); NJ. R EVID. 803(c) (4) (adding that the statement must be 
made "in good faith"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2803(4) (admitting 
"[s] tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and 
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain or sensations, if 
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment"), analyzed in Kennedy v. State, 
839· P.2d 667, 670 (Okla. Grim. App. 1992) (adopting the two-part test used by 
many other jurisdictions: that the declarant's motive must be consistent with 
receiving medical care and that it was reasonable for the doctor to rely on the 
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courts generally admit hearsay statements regarding symptoms and 
feelings made by a patient seeking medical treatment.106 Like the 
infonnation to diagnose or treat); S.G R EVID. 803(4) (allowing admission of 
statements made for purposes of medical treatment); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 19-
16-8 (providing admissibility of the statements "even though the declarant is 
available as a witness"); VT. R EVID. 803(4) (permitting the admission of 
"[s] tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. and 
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations 
[are not excluded as hearsay]"). 
Six states make a distinction between treating and examining physicians with 
regard to the admissibility of hearsay. See KAN. Cw. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-
460(1) ("unless the judge finds it was made in bad faith, a statement of the 
declarant's ... previous symptoms, pain or physical sensation, made to a phy-
sician consulted for treatment for diagnosis with a view to treatment, and rele-
vant to an issue of declarant's bodily condition" is admissible) (emphasis ad-
ded); 2 LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 803(4) (providing the statement must be 
made in connection with treatment); MICH. R EVID. 803 (4) (providing the 
statement must be made in connection with treatment and necessary to diag-
nosis and treatment); PA. R EVID. 803(4) (distinguishing in the comment that 
the Pennsylvania rule differs from the federal rule because "[s] tatements 
made to persons retained solely for the purpose of litigation are not admissi-
ble under this rule"); RI. R EVID. 803(4) (excluding statements "made to a 
physician consulted solely for the purposes of preparing for litigation or ob-
taining testimony for trial"); TENN. R EVID. 803(4) (providing in the advisory 
commission comment that "[t]he declaration must be for both diagnosis and 
treatment"). 
Finally, 6 states have not adopted any fonnal rules regarding the admissibil-
ity of statements made to physicians offered for the truth of the matter stated. 
SeeJohnson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 484,487 (1963) (holding that 
statements made to physicians regarding the cause of injury for purposes of 
diagnosis are admitted to show basis of opinion, but not for truth of matter 
asserted); Borowicz v. Seuring Transit Co., 240 N.E.2d 314, 319 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1968) (citing the common-law exception to the rule against hearsay for state-
ments made to physicians in the course of diagnosis or treatment.) Common-
wealth v. Costello, 582 N.E.2d 938, 941 (Mass. 1991) (recognizing the com-
mon-law exception to the hearsay rule if statements are made for the purpose 
of obtaining medical treatement) (citing P J. LIAcos, MAssACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 
346 (5th ed. 1981»; State v. Evans, 992 S.W.2d 275, 283 n.6 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1999) (admitting statements made to treating psychiatrists under the com-
mon-law exception to the hearsay rule); State v. Bailey, 675 N.YS.2d 706, 708 
(N.Y App. Div. 1998) (determining that statements contained in hospital 
records may be admissible under the guise of the business records exception 
if they are gennane to medical treatment); Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 492 
S.E.2d 131, 134 (Va. 1997) (statip.g that Virginia has not adopted a rule similar 
to Federal Rule 803(4) and declining to adopt a similar rule judicially in a 
child molestation case). 
106. See, e.g., Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 25, 536 A.2d. 666, 678 (1988) (observ-
ing that most jurisdictions have admitted statements of then existing medical. 
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Supreme Court, Maryland courts emphasize the declarant's/pa-
tient's underlying motivation of self-preservation, which guarantees 
the accuracy of statements made to treating physicians.107 
Unlike many jurisdictions, however, Maryland differentiates 
statements made to examiningl08 physicians from those made to 
treatinglO9 physicians. 110 The court of appeals considered this distinc-
tion in Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund. 11l In Candella, the plaintiff, 
a maid, sought recovery for an electric shock she received while at-
tempting to turn off her employer's vacuum.ll2 Bringing her claim 
before the Workmen's Compensation Committee, the plaintiff of-
conditions made to doctors because of the additional guarantee of trustwor-
thiness); Adams v. Benson, 208 Md. 261, 267, 117 A.2d 881, 883 (1955) (stat-
ing, among other things, that a doctor may testify to a patient's statements as 
to injury, symptoms, and feelings). 
107. See, e.g., Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 26, 536 A.2d at 678 ("[N]o one would will-
ingly risk medical injury as a result of improper treatment by withholding ll(!C-
essary data or furnishing false data to the physician who would determine the 
course of treatment on the basis of that data."). 
108. Traditionally, an examining physician is a medical professional consulted pri-
marily to qualify as an expert for litigation. See MCLAIN, supra note 52, § . 
2.803(p), at 255. Some courts have also referred to examining physicians as 
non-treating physicians. See generaUy Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 28, 536 A.2d at 
679 (1988) ("Maryland exempted from the evidentiary imprimatur statements 
made to a non-treating physician, such as an expert wimess preparing testi-
mony for trial.") (citing Parker v. State, 189 Md. 244, 249, 55 A.2d 784, 786 
(1947». For consistency and clarity, this Comment will use the term examin-
ing physicians. 
109. As the name implies, a treating physician is one who actually performs treat-
ment or to whom individuals describe their ailments in order to facilitate 
treatment. Therefore, any statements that are reasonably pertinent to treat-
ment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment are admissible. See MD. R 
EVID. 5-803 (b) (4) (admitting statements "made for purposes of medical treat-
ment or medical diagnosis in contemplation of treatment"); MCLAIN, supra 
note 52, § 2.803(p), at 255 (pointing out that Maryland case law distinguishes 
between statements for purposes of treatment and those made for purposes of 
diagnosis or "for litigation). However, such statements may also be admissible 
if the statement was made by a patient's "loved one" or, in the case of a 
child, by a parent. See id. § 2.803.4(q), at 256 (showing that the rules commit-
tee rejected the idea of limiting the rule to statements made only to health 
care providers). 
110. Notwithstanding the rule against hearsay, Maryland's rules of evidence leave 
significant alternatives to the skillful practitioner looking to admit hearsay 
made to an examining physician. See infra Part IV.A and accompanying text; 
see also infra Part III.C. 
111. 277 Md. 120, 353 A.2d 263 (1976). 
112. See id. at 122, 353 A.2d at 264. 
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fered the expert testimony of a non-treating psychiatrist she visited 
in preparation of litigation,113 along with hearsay statements she 
made during the examination.114 The trial court overturned the 
Worker's Compensation Commission's decision to admit the testi-
mony,115 and the court of appeals, granting certiorari prior to con-
sideration of the case by the court of special appeals, affirmed the 
trial court's ruling.116 
The court of appeals concluded that statements made to exam-
ining physicians lack the indicia of reliability accompanying those 
made to a treating physician. ll7 Although recognizing that other ju-
risdictions disagree with its perspective,118 the court refused to devi-
ate from its "more restrictive rule" of complete exclusion of hearsay 
statements made to examining physicians. 119 Discussing several in-
dicators of untrustworthiness,120 the court paid particular attention 
to the underlying purpose of the examination, commenting, "that 
appellant related the history to the psychia~st knowing that it was 
113. See id. at 122, 126, 353 A.2d at 264, 267 (noting that the plaintiff called a psy-
chiauist that she had been referred to by her attorney, but who never treated 
her). 
114. See id. at 126, 353 A.2d at 267 (observing that "the statements on which the 
physician's conclusions were based cannot withstand the close scrutiny of 
hearsay testimony"). 
115. See id. at 123, 353 A.2d at 265 (explaining that the uial court struck the testi-
mony because it was based on the case history supplied by the patient for the 
purpose of qualifying the doctor as an expert rather than for obtaining treat-
ment). 
116. See id. at 121-22, 353 A.2d at 264. 
117. See id. at 124, 353 A.2d at 265-66. 
118. See id. at 124, 353 A.2d at 266. The court discussed that other jurisdictions al-
low a non-treating doctor to testity as to the history received from a patient 
and the conclusions made therefrom. See id. (citing Adams v. Benson, 208 Md. 
261, 267-69, 117 A.2d 881, 883-84 (1955». However, the Maryland courts con-
sider such statements as untrustworthy because the patient knows that the 
statements "are being received primarily to enable the physician to prepare 
testimony on his behalf rather than for purposes of diagnosis and treatment." 
Id. at 124, 353 A.2d at 265-66. 
119. See id. (recognizing that there has been some criticism of Maryland's rule) 
(citing Adams, 208 Md. at 267-69, 117 A.2d at 883-84); see also Parker v. State, 
189 Md. 244, 249, 55 A.2d 784, 786 (1947) (discussing Maryland's exclusion of 
hearsay statements made by litigants to non-treating physicians for the pur-
pose of qualifying a doctor as an expert). 
120. See Candella, 277 Md. at 126, 353 A.2d at 267 (discussing the low probative 
value of the evidence, the subjective knowledge of the plaintiff that no treat-
ment would be rendered, and the nature of the expert's conclusions in light 
of his discipline). 
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merely for the purpose of qualifying him as a witness on her behalf 
.... Clearly, the statements on which the physician's conclusions 
were based cannot withstand the close scrutiny of hearsay testimony 
mandated by our prior decisions. "121 
One year later, however, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
modified this exception in Beahm v. ShortalL 122 Again, as in Candella, 
the court considered the admissibility of hearsay statements made to 
an examining physician. l23 To determine liability for a collision be-
tween the plaintiff's car and the defendant's tractor, the plaintiff of-
fered the expert testimony of a neurosurgery specialist he visited 
four years after the accident. l24 The plaintiff's visit to the specialist 
was solely to qualify him as an expert for litigation. l25 Nonetheless, 
the trial court admitted the physician's hearsay statements concern-
ing the patient's symptoms as substantive evidence.126 
Had the court of appeals in Beahm followed Candella, the oppo-
site result would have ensued; the trial court would have committed 
reversible error by admitting the evidence.127 Instead, the court of 
appeals adopted a new rule. l28 The court held that a doctor who ex-
amines a patient solely to qualify as an expert may not only testify 
as to his medical conclusions, but may also testify about the history 
relayed by the patient if that information formed the basis of the 
physician's conclusion.129 Although the court admitted the doctor's 
conclusions as substantive evidence, the Beahm court only admitted 
the patient's hearsay statements with a qualifying charge to the jury; 
those statements could only be considered as an explanation of the 
basis for the conclusions, rather than for the truth of the matter 
121. [d. 
122. 279 Md. 321, 368 A2d 1005 (1977). 
123. See id. at 323, 368 A2d at 1007. 
124. See id. at 328, 368 A2d at 1009-10. 
125. See id. 
126. See id. at 328, 368 A2d at 1010. 
127. See Candella v. Subsequent I~ury Fund, 277 Md. 120, 126, 353 A2d 263, 267 
(1976) (holding that the statements on which the physician's conclusions were 
based were inadmissible). 
128. Although the court took a broader approach than it had in Candella, it recog-
nized that there are even more expansive approaches used in other jurisdic-
tions and in the federal courts, under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See id. at 
327 n.5, 368 A.2d at 1009 n.5 (refusing to reach as far as the federal rule by 
allowing the medical history given by a patient to a non-treating physician to 
be admissible as substantive evidence). For the text of Federal Rule 803(4), 
see supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
129. See Beahm, 279 Md. at 327, 368 A2d at 1009. 
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asserted. 130 
Applying this new rule, the court of appeals held that the trial 
court committed error by admitting the evidence.l31 Yet, even 
though the trial court failed to instruct the jury with a qualifying 
charge as to those statements,132 the judgment of the trial court was 
nonetheless affirmed because the court of appeals considered the 
error harmless.133 
As Maryland courts began admitting statements which formed 
the basis of an examining physician's expert opinion, the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland reinforced the narrowness of the medi-
cal treatment hearsay exception in Cassidy v. State. 134 There, three 
days after a child was allegedly abused, a representative of Child 
Protective Services brought the victim to a physician for examina-
tion.135 Recognizing several signs of child abuse, the doctor repeat-
edly asked the victim to identifY the perpetrator of the acts.136 The 
child responded "Daddy" on all five occasions, and the court con-
cluded that the defendant, the boyfriend of the victim's mother was 
the person to whom the child referred. 137 
While conceding the admissibility of statements concerning the 
cause or external source of a condition as a hearsay exception,138 
the court excluded the victim's identification139 of her mother's boy-
friend as the abuser and reversed his conviction for child abuse and 
130. See id. 
131. See id. at 329, 368 A.2d at 10tO. 
132. See id. The court conceded that the plaintiff could have elicited such evidence 
through a hypothetical. See id. at 329 n.7, 368 A.2d at 1010 n.7 (citing Rosello 
v. Friedel, 243 Md. 234, 242, 220 A.2d 537, 541 (1966) (citing Wilhelm v. State 
Traffic Comm'n, 230 Md. 91, 97, 185 A.2d 715,717 (1962»). For a discussion 
of this technique and how it can be used to circumvent the rule against hear-
say, see infra Part IV.A. 
133. See id. at 332, 368 A.2d at 1012 ("The testimony of Dr. Russo which was admit-
ted in error ... was not 'substantially injurious' so as to have a prejudicial ef-
fect on the outcome of the case."). 
134. 74 Md. App. 1,8-9,536 A.2d 666, 669-70 (1988). 
135. See id. at 6, 536 A.2d at 668. 
136. See id. 
137. See id. at 5, 7, 536 A.2d at 668, 669. 
138. See id. at 26, 536 A.2d at 678 (citing Fisher Body Div. v. Alston, 252 Md. 51, 54-
55, 249 A.2d 130, 132-33 (1969); Riddle v. Dickens, 241 Md. 579,581, 217 A.2d 
304, 306 (1966». 
139. However, "[w]hen there is a danger that an assault victim may have con-
tracted a communicable disease, of course, the identity of the assailant may 
take on significant medical pertinence." Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 34 n.14, 536 
A.2d at 682 n.14. 
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criminal assault. l40 Focusing on the subjective knowledge of the de-
clarant,t41 the court concluded: "[o]nce the perceived end purpose 
of the examination moves beyond the medical treatment of a physi-
cal ailment, the reason for this particular exception ceases to exist 
the fear that a doctor will do a wrong and harmful thing to the de-
clarant's body. "142 
The Cassidy court criticized the practice of admitting statements 
made to examining physicians as substantive evidence because these 
admissions disregarded the declarant's subjective intent,143 mini-
mized guarantees of trustworthiness accompanying such state-
ments,l44 and made "nonsensical distinctions between the doctor's 
recommendation as to social disposition and the social worker's rec-
ommendation as to the same thing on the same facts."145 
In contrast to Cassidy, in In re Rachel T.,146 the court of special 
appeals vacated the trial court's decision not to admit the victim's 
statements made to a social worker, and remanded the case to the 
trial court to consider the statements.147 In that case, the State sus-
pected the victim's father abused her.l48 Finding several signs of pos-
sible sexual abuse, the child's attending physician referred her to a 
140. See id. at 50, 536 A.2d at 690. 
141. See id. at 29, 536 A.2d at 680 (discussing the doctor's inability to know the 
child's subjective understanding of the examination). 
142. Id. at 34, 536 A.2d at 682. 
143. See id. at 43-46, 536 A.2d at 686-88 (discussing United States v. Renville, 779 
F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985». The Cassidy court concluded that, by admitting 
statements made to examining physicians as substantive evidence, the Renville 
court ignored the declarant's subjective belief, resulting in the hearsay excep-
tion's departure from its common-law origin. See Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 44-45, 
536 A.2d 687-88. 
144. See id. at 43, 536 A.2d at 686 (criticizing the Renville court for making "medical 
pertinence" the "key" issue). According to the Cassidy court, the federal ap-
proach hinges on the assumption that, "[s] ince doctors may be assumed not 
to want to waste their time with unnecessary history, the fact that a doctor 
took the information is prima facie evidence that it was pertinent." Id. at 47, 
536 A.2d at 688; see also id. at 47, 536 A.2d at 688-89 (criticizing the conclusion 
in People v. Wilkins, 349 N.W.2d 815, 817 (Mich. App. 1984) that "facts reliable 
enough to serve as a basis for medical diagnosis are also reliable enough to 
escape the hearsay proscription ... "). Disagreeing with this perspective, the 
court maintained Maryland's common-law position of the difference between 
a court's reliance on hearsay and an expert's reliance on hearsay, finding no " 
necessity to equate the two. See id. at 47, 536 A.2d at 689. 
145. Id. at 49, 536 A.2d at 689. 
146. 77 Md. App. 20, 549 A.2d 27 (1988). 
147. See id. at 40, 549 A.2d at 37. 
148. See id. at 27, 549 A.2d at 30. 
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pediatric gynecologist.149 Unwilling to speak to the gynecologist, the 
child spoke to a female social worker in his office, claiming that she 
had a "secret" with her father "and that if she told her Mom her fa-
ther would be in big trouble."150 Extending the medical treatment 
hearsay exception to the social worker, lSI the court concluded that 
Rachel's comments should have been admitted as substantive 
evidence .152 
Although affirming Cassidy's emphasis on the subjective belief 
of the declarant,153 the court nonetheless distinguished the two 
cases.154 Unlike Cassidy,155 the Rachel T. court concluded that the 
cognitive development of the nearly five year old victim allowed her 
to comprehend the gravity of the situation.156 To bolster this conclu-
sion, the court further relied on the sophistication of the child's 
statementl57- the child understood the concept of a secret, the im-
portance of keeping it,15S and the severity of the situation.159 Fur-
thermore, the social worker explained the consequences of Rachel's 
statements.160 When meeting with Rachel, the social worker ex-
plained the reason for the pediatric gynecologist'S examination,161 
noting that the doctor would treat her in accordance with the infor-
149. See id. at 24-25, 549 A.2d at 29. 
150. [d. at 25, 549 A.2d at 30. 
151. See id. at 33, 549 A.2d at 33. 
152. See id. at 36, 549 A.2d at 35 (holding that the trial court erroneously excluded 
the statements). 
153. See id. at 34, 549 A.2d at 34 (characterizing the belief of the declarant as "vi-
tally important"). 
154. See id. at 33-36, 549 A.2d at 33-35. 
155. See id. at 34, 549 A.2d at 34 (noting that the Cassidy declarant was two years 
old). 
156. See id. at 35, 549 A.2d at 34 (noting the probability that Rachel was frightened 
at the unexplained appearance of blood in her panties, resulting in her ability 
to recognize her own physical self-interest and understand that her statements 
would be used to provide medical treatment); see also lee, supra note 26, at 
568 n.69 (recognizing that Maryland courts make case-by-case determinations 
using the age of the declarant as a factor in determining cognitive develop-
ment). 
157. See Rachel T., 77 Md. App. at 35, 549 A.2d at 34 ("The content of Rachel's 
statement itself indicates a certain degree of sophistication."). 
158. Cf Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 6, 536 A.2d 666, 668 (1988) (noting that, 
e in response to inquiries about the perpetrator, the child said, "Daddy"). 
159. Compare Rachel T., 77 Md. App. at 23-24, 549 A.2d at 29 (describing the child's 
vaginal bleeding), with Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 6, 536 A.2d at 668 (describing 
the child's three day-old bruises). 
160. See Rachel T., 77 Md. App. at 35, 549 A.2d at 34. 
161. See id. In Cassidy, no such explanation took place. 
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mation she conveyed. 162 
The court also relied on a footnote in Cassidy63 to distinguish 
the two cases. l64 The Rachel T. court noted that the evidence of 
abuse in Cassidy was external and not indicative of the transmission 
of a communicable disease. 165 In contrast, Rachel faced the possibil-
ity of contracting a communicable disease given the nature of the 
evidence of abuse. 166 
The Rachel T. court also concluded that the victim's pediatric 
gynecologist, who performed no treatment but referred Rachel to a 
social worker, nonetheless qualified as a treating physician.167 Given 
the victim's impetus for visiting the doctor,168 and the physician's 
need for an accurate medical history for effective treatment,169 the 
court concluded that the hearsay declarations were fully admissi-
ble.170 Therefore, although the treating physician remembered see-
ing the victim only once,171 and the statement was made to a social 
worker referred by the witness, rather than directly to the physi-
cian,172 the court determined the trial court erroneously excluded 
the statements.173 
162. See id. Therefore, this notification ensures that the traditional guarantee of 
trustworthiness underlying this exception to the rule against hearsay is pres-
ent; the declarant is informed that her statements will affect the success of 
the impending medical treatment. For a discussion of this consideration, see 
supra note 59. 
163. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
164. See Rachel T., 77 Md. App. at 36, 549 A.2d at 35. 
165. See id. at 34-35, 549 A.2d at 34. 
166. See id. at 36, 549 A.2d at 35. 
167. See id. at 35, 549 A.2d at 35 (" [The pediatric gynecologist] was a 'treating' 
physician because Rachel's regular pediatrician referred Rachel and her par-
ents in order to ascertain the cause of Rachel's bleeding."). 
168. The court specifically noted that the victim did not meet with the pediatrician 
in preparation of litigation. See id. at 35, 549 A.2d at 35. 
169. See id. at 36, 549 A.2d at 35. The court pointed out that "[a]scertaining the 
identity of the abuser was also important ... because effective treatment 
might have required Rachel's removal from the home." [d. 
170. See id. at 33, 549 A.2d at 33 (determining that the statements were admissible 
under the medical treatment and business record exceptions to the rule 
against hearsay). 
171. See id. at 36, 549 A.2d at 35. 
172. See id. The court emphasized that this interdisciplinary approach was common 
practice in the office and that the gynecologist relied directly on statements 
made to social workers in making his diagnosis and prescribing treatment. See 
id. 
173. See id. 
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In Low v. State,174 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
muddied the distinction between treating and examining physicians 
by reversing the petitioner's convictions for second-degree rape, sec-
ond-degree sexual offense, and child abuse because the trial court 
admitted the victim's hearsay statements made to a child abuse ex-
pert.175 At trial, the victim reluctantly testified that, the "appellant 
touched her in a 'private part' in the 'front' and in the 'back,' and 
that he 'stuck something into me,' which hurt."176 A pediatrician 
and child abuse expert examined the twelve year old victim and 
concluded, based on the physical evidence, that someone abused 
the child.177 During the examination, the child stated that the appel-
lant "put his penis in her vagina and in her 'butt' more than ten 
times."178 In response, the appellant contended that the allegation 
resulted from his disciplining the child.179 On cross-examination, the 
child admitted several lies, including at least one concerning the ap-
pellant. lso A jury found the appellant guilty of all three offenses and 
sentenced him to fIfty-fIve years of incarceration.18l 
The court of appeals concluded that the doctor was an examin-
ing physician.182 Therefore, according to the court, the jury could 
not consider the doctor's recitation of hearsay statements as sub-
stantive evidence.183 Describing her as essentially a "part of the pros-
ecution team,"I84 the court found reversible error in the trial court's 
174. 119 Md. App. 413, 705 A.2d 67, cert. denied, 350 Md. 278, 711 A.2d 870 (1998). 
175. See id. at 416-17, 705 A.2d at 68-{59. 
176. Id. at 416, 705 A.2d at 69. 
177. See id. 
178. Id. 
179. See id. 
180. See id. 
181. See id. at 416-17, 705 A.2d at 69. 
182. See Low, 119 Md. App. at 425, 705 A.2d at 73. The dissent, however, noted 
there was evidence that, had the child required treatment, the doctor would 
have administered it, and that the trial court accordingly found sufficient in-
dicia of a treating physician under Maryland Rule 5-803(4). See id. at 428-32, 
705 A.2d at 75-76 (Alpert, j., dissenting). The m~ority emphasized that al-
though the doctor comprehensively reviewed the child's physical health (Le. 
by examining eyes, ears, nose, and skeletal system), the Department of Social 
Services referred the child for a complete medical examination, rather than 
treatment. See id. at 423, 705 A.2d at 72 (revealing the physician's subjective 
belief as to the purpose of the examination). But see id. at 424, 705 A.2d at 72 
(labeling the subjective belief of the doctor as "immaterial"). 
183. See id. at 420, 705 A.2d at 70. 
184. Id. at 425, 705 A.2d at 73. In effect, the court equated statements to a social 
worker or pediatric gynecologist with statements made to physicians that are 
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unlimited admission of the victim's statements. ISS 
In doing so, the court emphasized the absence of evidence 
tending to show the child's awareness of the importance of the 
medical examination.186 According to the court, this lack of aware-
ness would not create the impression that the doctor would be ren-
dering treatment. 187 Thus, the court concluded that the victim did 
not contemplate treatment when she advised her physician. 188 
Rather than affirming the factual conclusions of the trial court,189 
the court reasoned that: 
A child of twelve years, who has never before been seen by 
a doctor (and will never again be seen by this doctor), who 
is poked at and prodded in virtually every area of her body, 
and who is asked a multitude of questions, some quite sen-
sitive in nature, is most likely, at the very least, an extremely 
intimidated little girl, who has little grasp of why she was 
sent to this strange doctor in a strange setting. If anything, 
consulted solely in preparation of litigation with regard to the lack of nust-
worthiness Maryfund courts find in hearsay. 
185. See id. at 426, 705 A.2d at 73-74. 
186. See id. at 422, 705 A.2d at 72. But see id. at 428, 705 A.2d at 74-75 (Alpert, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the standard procedure of the doctor was to discuss 
the importance of the examination with the patient and that, at trial, the doc-
tor testified that "[s)he had no reason to think she had done otherwise with 
[the victim]"). 
187. See id. at 424, 705 A.2d at 73. One should note, however, that when a trial 
court considers the admissibility of statements made to a treating physician in 
pursuit of treatment, it does not make a separate consideration of whether 
the patient subjectively did conclude or reasonably should have concluded 
that the success of her treatment hinged on the veracity of her statements. 
But see id. at 413, 425, 705 A.2d 67, 73 (1998); In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 
34, 549 A.2d 27, 34 (1988); Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 29, 536 A.2d 666, 
680 (1988) (stating that a patient's subjective purpose is "vitally important"). 
188. But see Low, 119 Md. App. at 433-34, 705 A.2d at 77 (Alpert, J., dissenting). In 
his dissent, Judge Paul Alpert noted that a litigant may prove subjective pur-
pose, like intent or motive, through extrinsic evidence if direct and objective 
proof does not exist. See id. (Alpert, J., dissenting). Therefore, because Judge 
Alpert emphasized Janine's consciousness throughout the examination, he did 
not discuss her subjective belief with her doctor. See id. (Alpert J., dissenting). 
Given the extent of the examination, he believed the court could draw an 
equally permissible inference that she fully understood that the examination 
exceeded an examination for sexual abuse. See id. (Alpert J., dissenting). But 
see id. at 424, 705 A.2d at 73 (characterizing such possible treatment rendered 
as "incidental and secondary to [the physician's] primary role as a forensic 
examiner") . 
189. But see supra note 14. 
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[the victim] had a right to be downright SUSpICIOUS as to 
why the doctor was examining her in body areas other than 
those stemming from the complained of incident, and that, 
in our opinion, would have promoted [the victim] 's distrust 
of and perhaps dishonesty with the doctor much more than 
it would have facilitated a relationship of truSt. I90 
In so concluding, the Low court apparently followed the restric-
tiveness of Cassidy,191 even though there were factual similarities to 
Rachel T.192 For instance, one of the major concerns in Cassidy was 
the victim's young age and possible inability to understand the 
cause-and-effect relationship between statements to a doctor and the 
ensuing treatment.193 Conversely, the court in Rachel T. seemed to 
emphasize the ability of that particular five year old victim to under-
stand the importance of the statements in her treatment.194 There-
fore, to be consistent with Maryland case law, without reversing its 
own decision in Rachel T., the court of special appeals should have 
recognized that the twelve year old victim in Low realized the grav-
ity of the examination and hence, appreciated the cause-and-effect 
relationship between her statements and treatment. Although the 
court concluded otherwise,195 being poked and prodded "in virtually 
every area of her body" would likely indicate such gravity to even 
the most "intimidated little girl." 
Yet, rather than concentrating on the child's ability to under-
stand the purpose underlying the treatment, the Low court high-
lighted the victim's inclination to deceive the physician.196 Notwith-
standing the victim's likely understanding of the situation's 
190. Low, 119 Md. App. at 424-25, 705 A.2d at 73. 
191. For a discussion of Cassidy, see supra notes 134-45 and accompanying text. 
While the Low majority agreed there were factual dissimilarities between Low 
and Cassidy, the court found the victim's reticence to testify in Low similar to 
Cassidy, where the victim did not testify. See id. at 417 n.1, 705 A.2d at 69 n.1. 
It is interesting to note, however, that the United States Supreme Court in 
White v. Illinois concluded that the availability of the declarant is irrelevant 
when the evidence falls under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, such as the 
medical treatment exception. See supra Part lILA; see also MD. R. EVlD. 5-
803(b) (4). 
192. For a discussion of &chel T., see supra notes 146-73 and accompanying text. 
193. See Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 30, 536 A.2d at 680. 
194. See &chel T., 77 Md. App. at 35, 549 A.2d at 34. 
195. See Low, 119 Md. App. at 424-25, 705 A.2d at 73 (concluding that the victim 
was very "intimidated" and likely had little grasp as to why she was sent to the 
doctor). 
196. See id. at 425, 705 A.2d at 73. 
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consequences, the court held, as a matter of law, that the victim 
subjectively believed that her physician was an examining one, on 
whose observations her treatment would not rely.197 Apparently in 
Maryland, there is an undefined age where appreciation of the 
cause-and-effect relationship between statement and treatment be-
comes a warped knowledge that insincere statements may lead to re-
covery in litigation or conviction for child abuse. 198 Despite this in-
clination to deceive, these hearsay declarations would be admissible 
to substantiate an expert opinion under Beahm v. ShortalL 199 
Furthermore, the Low court expressed concern over the ensu-
ing lack of contact between the doctor and her patient.200 However, 
no such concern appeared in Rachel T. In fact, the Rachel T. court 
found the statements made to the child abuse expert admissible, 
even though the physician only saw the child once.201 Unlike the 
Rachel T. court, the Low court indicated that the one-time visit weak-
ened the statement's trustworthiness.202 Therefore, to the numerous 
unsettled questions concerning the use of hearsay statements in 
contemplation of treatment, the Low court added the existence or 
possibility of follow-up visits as a factor in determining the trustwor-
thiness of hearsay statements. The results of this logic add more un-
certainty: statements during a five-minute, one-time visit to a treat-
ing physician are admissible, but those made to a trusted, oft-visited 
examining physician who does not have the good fortune of finding 
an ailment that requires several visits, may not be admissible. 
Although the Low court did not explicitly require treatment of 
the declarant for hearsay statements to be admitted under the ex-
197. See id. (finding there was no evidence that the victim had the subjective intent 
to communicate potential ailments in "hopes of further treatment"). 
198. See Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 30, 536 A.2d at 680 (criticizing the State's attempt 
to bridge this "unbridgeable gap in the orthodox syllogism" created by these 
competing considerations). The Cassidy court found that a child's lack of mo-
tive to fabricate is "quite beside the point," in that the focus is on the appre-
ciation of the cause-and-effect relationship between statements and treatment. 
[d. But see supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
199. 279 Md. 321, 368 A.2d 1005 (1977); see infra notes 264-77 and accompanying 
text. 
200. See Low, 119 Md. App. at 424-25, 705 A.2d at 73 (noting that a child would be 
intimidated by a "strange doctor in a strange setting" and a child would not 
understand that further treatment would be rendered unless the doctor spe-
cifically communicated these intentions). 
201. See Ro.chel T., 77 Md. App. at 36, 549 A.2d at 35. 
202. See Low, 119 Md. App. at 424-25, 705 A.2d at 73. 
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ception, its holding hints at the possibility that, in fact, actual treat-
ment may be required. In the words of the Low court: 
At no time did [the child abuse expert] render treatment 
to Janine, and the doctor's subjective observation that she 
might have rendered treatment had treatment been neces-
sary should not control the determination of her role for 
purposes of the admission of hearsay evidence. Put in gen-
eral terms, the mere ability to render treatment does not 
automatically give rise to the inference that one is categori-
cally a "treating physician" as Rule 5-803 (b) (4) contem-
plates the term. Something more is needed than the mere 
possibility that further treatment could be rendered. If that 
were not the case, then any [Department of Health and 
Human Services] doctor who examines a child would qual-
ify as a treating physician within 5-803(b)(4). Or, taken to 
its utmost extreme, any doctor who examines an individual 
could arguably "treat" that individual if necessity called for 
it. Would, then, every doctor who examines a person qualify 
as a "treating physician?" Certainly not, or the rule would 
be rendered utterly meaningless.203 
The difficulty in precisely defining this "something more" under-
scores the general difficulty and arbitrariness of determining the de-
marcation between treating and examining. However, under the 
federal rules of evidence, this distinction is unnecessary. 
C. An Alternative Treatment-The Federal Perspective 
Unlike Maryland, federal courts do not distinguish between 
statements made to examining and treating physicians, opting in-
stead to fully admit all statements pertaining to bodily condition or 
medical history when made in relation to diagnosis or treatment.204 
Finding jury instructions limiting the admissibility of the statements 
ineffective,205 the federal courts abandoned any restrictions on the 
admissibility of hearsay statements to examining physicians.206 The 
203. [d. at 425-26, 705 A.2d at 73. 
204. See supra note 105 for the text of Federal Rule 803(4). 
205. But see infra note 275 and accompanying text. 
206. According to the Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 
803(4): 
Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay exception, as 
not within its guarantee of truthfulness, statements to a physician 
consulted only for the purpose of enabling him to testify. While these 
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federal system is intended to admit statements made to examining 
physicians,207 statements made to non-physicians consulted for medi-
cal treatment or diagnosis,20B and statements by someone other than 
the patient to obtain treatment for the patient.209 
This change also has significant practical consequences. If an 
expert's opinion is admissible, even though it is based on an inad-
missible hearsay statement,21O the logical conclusion is that a jury 
could likewise depend on the statement.211 According to one noted 
commentator: "[ u] nder prior practice [in which courts distin-
guished between examining and treating physicians], contrived evi-
dence was avoided at too great a cost and in substantial departure 
from the realities of medical practice. "212 This polar opposite of the 
Maryland perspective on the medical treatment hearsay exception is 
evidenced by two seminal cases in the United States Court of Ap-
statements were not admissible as substantive evidence, the expert 
was allowed to state the basis of his opinion, including statements of 
this kind. The distinction thus called for was one most unlikely to be 
made by juries. The rule accordingly rejects the limitation. This posi-
tion is consistent with the provision of [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 
703 that the facts on which expert testimony is based need not be ad-
missible in evidence if of a kind ordinarily relied upon by experts in 
·the field. 
FED. R EVlD. 803(4), Advisory Committee's note; see also FED. R EVlD. 703 (pro-
viding for the admission of facts or data upon which an expert in a particular 
field would ordinarily rely, even though otherwise inadmissible into evidence). 
For a discussion of the general effectiveness of limiting instructions, see infra 
Part IV.B. 
207. See FED. R EVlD. 803(4) (stating that examinations as required by Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 35, fall within this hearsay exception and are normally ad-
mitted). 
208. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 277, at 431 (noting that statements made 
to non-physicians and nurses are included under the Federal Rule); MCLAIN, 
supra note 52, § 803(4).2, at 370 (same). 
209. See, e.g., MCLAIN, supra note 52, § 803(4).2, at 370 (noting that the federal 
rules allow admission of statements made by persons assisting the patient in 
obtaining medical assistance). 
210. Such an expert opinion is admissible under Maryland's rules of evidence. See 
supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. Notably, the statements underlying 
this expert opinion are likewise admissible not for the truth of the matter as-
serted, but solely as the basis for the opinion. See supra notes 129-30 and ac-
companying text. 
211. For an illustrative example of this reasoning, see infra notes 215-31 and ac-
companying text. 
212. MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 278, at 432 (noting that Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 803(4) eliminates distinctions between examining and treating physi-
cians) . 
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peals for the Eighth Circuit-United States v. Iron Shell!13 and United 
States v. Renville.214 
In Iron Shell, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed the 
defendant's conviction for assault with intent to rape, despite his 
contention that the victim's statements to her physician215 were inad-
missible hearsay.216 Here, the State alleged that the defendant at-
tempted to rape a nine year old girl.217 The victim claimed the 
defendant put his arm around her, asked her to pull her pants 
down, and then proceeded to pull them down himself after she re-
fused. 218 Mter continuously screaming, the victim drew the attention 
of other community members.219 Crying, the victim emerged from 
the bushes, pulling up her pants.220 During a subsequent medical 
examination, the child told the doctor that a man dragged her into 
the bushes, attempted to muffle her screams by covering her mouth 
and neck, pulled many of her clothes off, and then stuck something 
into her vagina that hurt.221 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ap-
plied a two-part inquiry: "first, is the declarant's motive consistent 
with the purpose of the rule; and second, is it reasonable for the 
213. 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980). 
214. 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of United States v. Renvilk, see in-
fra notes 23247 and accompanying text. 
215. Notably, the court mentioned its past distinction between treating and non-
treating physicians, describing the latter as "a doctor who is consulted only in 
order to testify as a witness." Iron Shel~ 633 F.2d at 83 & n.8 (emphasis ad-
ded). Recognizing the abandonment of this distinction by the then newly 
adopted Federal Rule 803(4), the court concluded that these cases may be 
persuasive authority in determining whether a patient's statements are perti-
nent for diagnosis or treatment. But see Low v. State, 119 Md. App. 413, 425, 
705 A.2d 67, 73 (1998) (holding that an examining physician included a pedi-
atrician/ child abuse expert). 
216. See Iron Shel~ 633 F.2d at 83. The defendant contended that the doctor acted 
more as an investigator than as a medical examiner by asking the victim "if 
the man 'had taken her clothes off.'" Id. at 82 n.6. The defense further ar-
gued that the answer to this question did not relatively affect the nature of 
the medical examination, and therefore did not result from an inquiry "'rea-
sonably pertinent' to diagnosis or treatment." Id. at 83 (discussing FED. R 
EvlD. 803(4». 
217. See Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 80. 
218. See id. at 81. 
219. See id. at 80. 
220. See id. at 81. 
221. See id. at 81-82. 
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physician to rely on the information in diagnosis or treatment. "222 
The court first determined that the declarant's motive was consis-
tent with the underpinnings of the rule.223 The court, illuminating 
factors such as the purpose of the examination224 and the victim's 
age,225 emphasized that nothing about the victim's demeanor indi-
cated a motive other than a patient seeking treatment.226 Therefore, 
the court concluded that the victim's statements to her doctor satis-
fied the trustworthiness requirement.227 
The court further concluded that the information was perti-
nent to the diagnosis and treatment of the victim's possible ail-
ments.228 Notwithstanding the defendant's argument that the doc-
tor's questions would not affect the scope of his examination, and 
therefore were not pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, the court re-
fused to find this fact dispositive.229 According to the court, 
"[ d] iscovering what is not injured is equally as pertinent to treat-
ment and diagnosis as finding what is injured. "230 Again, the court 
based its conclusion on the doctor's subjective reliance on the state-
222. Id. at 84. According to the Iron Shell court, these considerations are an out-
growth of the policy considerations underlying the rule. See id. The first prong 
of the test results from the desire to ensure that the patient has the requisite 
self-interest and motive to speak truthfully and openly. See id. The second 
prong results from the court's belief that if the information is so accurate that 
a doctor feels comfortable basing a life and death decision on it, then the 
rule against hearsay should not block its admission as substantive evidence. See 
id. 
223. See id. ("We find no facts in the record to indicate that [the victim]'s motive 
in making these statements was other than as a patient seeking treatment."). 
224. See id. The doctor testified that the underlying purposes of his examination 
were to treat the victim and to preserve physical evidence. See id. But see Low 
v. State, 119 Md. App. 413, 433-34, 705 A.2d 67, 77 (1998) (finding the doc-
tor's subjective belief as to the purpose of the examination irrelevant to the 
determination of the trustworthiness of the victim's statement). 
225. See Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84 (deferring to the trial court's determination that 
the victim's age of nine years did not mitigate against a finding of trustworthi-
ness). But see Low, 119 Md. App. at 424-25, 705 A.2d at 73 (concluding, not-
withstanding the trial court's determination, that a 12 year old girl would nor-
mally be very intimidated in such a situation and would, therefore be 
untrustworthy) . 
226. See Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84. But see Low, 119 Md. App. at 424-25, 705 A.2d at 
73. 
227. See Iron Shel~ 633 F.2d at 85. 
228. See id. at 84-85. 
229. See id. at 84. 
230. Id. 
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ments in determining a course of treatment.231 
In United States v. Renville,232 a case highly criticized in Mary-
land,233 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed the defendant's convictions on two counts of child abuse.234 
In this case, the victim's half-brother testified at his own detention 
hearing that the eleven year old victim admitted to him that 
Renville sexually abused her.235 A few weeks following the victim's 
removal, a physician examined the child, who recounted multiple 
instances of sexual behavior with the defendant.236 However, at trial, 
the victim recanted her story and denied telling anyone that the 
defendant had abused her, aside from the Deputy Sheriff.237 None-
theless, a jury convicted the defendant,238 who was sentenced to two 
concurrent fifteen-year terms. 239 
Although the court applied the Iron Shell analysis,240 it deviated 
significantly from a consideration explicitly mentioned in Iron Shell. 
Although both the Iron Shell decision and the Advisory Committee 
notes to the federal rules indicate otherwise,241 the Renville court 
231. See id. at 84-85. The court also considered Weinstein's contention that a doc-
tor's immediate need for relevant statements constitutes prima facie evidence 
of the statement's pertinence. See id. at 85 n.11 (quoting 4 WEINSTEIN & BER-
GER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803-130 (1979». The court chose not to adopt this 
extreme approach, opting instead to conduct a case-by-case analysis. See Iron 
Shell, 633 F.2d at 85 n.11. 
232. 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985). 
233. See Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 45, 536 A.2d 666, 687-88 (1988) (accusing 
the Renville court of severing the medical treatment exception to the rule 
against hearsay from its common-law roots). 
234. See Renville, 779 F.2d at 441. 
235. See id. at 432 (referring allegations of sexual abuse to the Deputy Sheriff, who 
conducted a further investigation and removed the victim from her home, af-
ter this testimony by the defendant). 
236. See id. 
237. See id. 
238. See id. 
239. See id. 
240. See id. at 436-39. See also supra note 222 (discussing the Iron Shell two-prong 
test) . 
241. According to the Iron Shell court, "[i]t is important to note that the statements 
concern what happened rather than who assaulted her. The former in most 
cases is pertinent to diagnosis and treatment while the latter would seldom, if 
ever, be sufficiently related." Iron Shel~ 633 F.2d at 84 (citing United States v. 
Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added». In a subse-
quent footnote, the court also relied on the Advisory Committee note for the 
following example: "a patient's statement that he was struck by an automobile 
would qualifY but not his statement that the car was driven through a red 
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held that statements of fault are pertinent to medical treatment 
when the incident involves a member of the child's immediate fam-
ily, and are therefore admissible to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted.242 While the court conceded that, ordinarily, statements of 
fault made during a medical examination are not pertinent to treat-
ment,243 it concluded that the consideration changes when the al-
leged assailant is a member of the victim's immediate household.244 
The court declared that the emotional and psychological trauma ac-
companying child abuse by a member of the child's household,245 
the cyclical nature of child abuse,246 and the doctor's statutory obli-
gation to report suspected victims of child abuse supported its con-
clusion to affirm the defendant's conviction.247 
IV. THE NEED FOR CHANGE 
If Renville and Iron Shell had been decided under Maryland law, 
their outcomes would have been very different. Rather than entrust-
ing the jury to make a credibility determination,248 Maryland courts 
choose to exclude trustworthy evidence249 simply because it involves 
statements to examining physicians.250 Given the significant loop-
light." Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84 n.lO (citing FED. R EVID. 803(4) Advisory Com-
mittee's note). 
242. See Renville, 779 F.2d at 436. 
243. See id. 
244. See id. at 436-37. 
245. See id. at 437 (comparing sexual abuse to other examples provided by the Ad-
visory Committee's notes, concluding that" [s]exual abuse of children at 
home presents a wholly different situation"). 
246. See id. at 437 n.12 (relying on the physician's testimony that child abuse will 
continually occur if the victim is returned to the abuser's household and that 
80% of child abusers today were once abuse victims themselves). 
247. See id. at 438. 
248. Under Maryland law, determinations of witness (and, by logical extension, de-
clarant) credibility are within the province of the jury. See infra Part IV.B. But 
see Low v. State, 119 Md. App. 413, 424-25, 705 A.2d 67, 73 (1998) (judging the 
subjective intent of the declarant). 
249. Obviously, with every rule of exclusion, there is the probability that trustwor-
thy evidence will be excluded in some cases. See, e.g., Milich, supra note 8, at 
725. Therefore, rules of exclusion must be carefully tailored to meet their in-
tended public policy considerations. 
250. See Low, 119 Md. App. at 419, 705 A.2d at 70 (continuing to disallow a non-
treating doctor to testify (citing Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 277 Md. 
120, 124, 353 A.2d 263 (1976) (citing Rossello v. Friedel, 243 Md. 234, 241-42, 
220 A.2d 537, 541 (1966»»; Wilhelm v. State Traffic Safety Comm'n, 230 Md. 
91, 97, 185 A.2d 715, 717 (1962) ("[T]he principle that a non-treating physi-
cian may not relate the history given to him by a litigant."); Wolfinger v. Frey, 
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holes available to a litigant looking to evade this exception, and the 
existence of other assurances of trustworthiness, the treating/ exam-
ining distinction does little to serve the public policy considerations 
generally underlying the rule against hearsay.251 
A. Pragmatic Loopholes Undermining Maryland's Treating/Examining 
Physician Distinction 
1. The Residual Hearsay Exception 
Aside from the other exceptions to the rule against hearsay 
that overlap the medical treatment exception,252 another significant 
loophole is the residual hearsay exception.253 -while the purpose of 
this hearsay exception is not to swallow the entire rule against hear-
say,254 it does provide yet another alternative to be used by those liti-
223 Md. 184, 190, 162 A.2d 745, 748 (1960) (holding an examining doctor was 
"not permitted to testify with regard to, or on the basis of, the case history 
given to him by [the plaintiff]"); Parker v. State, 189 Md. 244, 248-50, 55 A.2d 
784, 786 (1947) (holding the court properly excluded "case history" testimony 
of a non-treating physician who examined the patient on the day of the trial); 
see also supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. 
251. For a discussion of the policy reasons underlying this exception to the rule 
against hearsay, see supra Part II.B. 
252. For a discussion of other exceptions to the rule against hearsay that overlap 
with the medical diagnosis or treatment hearsay exception, and a hypothetical 
situation in which these exceptions would affect the admissibility of such evi-
dence, see supra note 60. 
253. Maryland's residual hearsay exception provides: 
Under exceptional circumstances, the following are not excluded by 
the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: 
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing [twenty-
three hearsay] exceptions [enumerated in this rule] but having 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court 
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a mate-
rial fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which 
it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can pro-
cure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of 
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admis-
sion of the statement into evidence. 
MD. R. EVID. 5-803 (b) (24). See also FED. R. EVID. 805 (providing a similar 
residual exception for the federal courts); MD. R. EVID. 5-804(b) (5) (providing 
a similar provision for instances in which the declarant is unavailable). 
254. For a thorough discussion of the development and debate regarding Mary-
land's residual hearsay exception, see MCLAIN, supra note 52, § 2.803.4(jj), at 
268-70 (discussing legislative debate over adoption of Maryland's residual 
hearsay rule); Howard S. Chasanow & Jose Felipe Anderson, The Residual 
Hearsay Exception: Maryland's Lukewarm Welcome, 24 U. BALT. L. REv. 1, 24-25 
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gants looking to admit hearsay statements made to examining physi-
cians; namely, the residual hearsay exception. 
Maryland's residual hearsay exception is not nearly as inclusive 
as Rule 5-803 (b) (4), however. Whereas statements made in contem-
plation of treatment are automatically admitted,255 a litigant's reli-
ance on the residual hearsay exception requires a significant show-
ing of trustworthiness256 and probative value. 257 The notice 
requirement under the residual hearsay exception also provides a 
procedural stumbling block not included in the general medical 
treatment exception to the rule against hearsay.258 Furthermore, 
most courts and litigants are generally reluctant to rely on this hear-
say exception, choosing to limit their emphasis on the numerous 
recognized exceptions.259 
(1994) (opining that the debate regarding the adoption of Maryland's 
residual hearsay exception indicates that the legislature and the courts expect 
that, although the rule is necessary, it will be used rarely and only in excep-
tional circumstances). 
255. Since Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-803 (b) (4) requires courts to admit certain 
hearsay statements, this evidence is not even subject to the state provisions ex-
cluding relevant, but unfairly prejudicial evidence. See MD. R EvID. 5-403 (ex-
cluding such evidence); MCLAiN, supra note 52, § 2.403.4, at 95 ("Rule 5-403 
applies even when evidence 'may' (but not if it 'shall') be admitted under a 
more specific Rule."). 
256. Of the requirements posed by the residual hearsay exception, this is the most 
difficult to meet. See LILLY, supra note 35, § 7.28, at 352 (discussing the federal 
residual hearsay exception). Such difficulty also arises when a litigant attempts 
to present evidence under the residual exception when the evidence is ad-
dressed by another existing exception. See id. (arguing that the residual excep-
tion should not be invoked to admit evidence that is already addressed by a 
recognized exception); MCLAiN, supra note 52, § 2.803.4(jj) at 269 (discussing 
the possible implications of the advisory committee note's reference to "new 
and presently unanticipated situations"). 
257. Compare MD. R EVID. 5-803 (b) (4) (admitting statements in contemplation of 
medical treatment "insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis 
in contemplation of treatment"), with MD. R EVID. 5-803 (b) (24) (requiring, 
among other things, a showing of probative value before admission). Further-
more, "[i]t is particularly appropriate for [the state courts] to exercise this 
power when the fact-finder is in a good position to evaluate the reliability of 
the hearsay evidence." MCLAiN, supra note 52, § 803(24).1, at 435. 
258. Compare MD. R EVID. 5-803 (b) (4) (allowing for the automatic admission of 
statements falling within the stated hearsay exception); FED. R EVID. 803(4) 
(same), with Md. R. Evid. 5-803 (b) (24) (requiring notice before employing 
the hearsay exception); FED. R EVID. 805 (same); MD. R EVID. 5-804(b)(5) 
(providing a residual hearsay exception when the declarant is unavailable). 
259. See MD. R EVID. 5-803(b)(24) Advisory Committee note ("It is intended that 
the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in excep-
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Therefore, even though the residual hearsay exception does al-
low the admission of especially trustworthy evidence, it offers little 
hope for litigants and defendants looking to admit hearsay state-
ments made to examining physicians. In fact, one could question 
whether a Maryland court would ever regard statements to examin-
ing physicians to be equally as trustworthy as statements admitted 
under an established hearsay exception. As stated by the Cassidy 
court: "[t]he heart of the exception ... is 'the underlying rationale 
... that the patient's statements to his doctor are apt to be sincere 
when made with an awareness that the quality and success of the 
treatment may largely depend on the accuracy of the information 
provided the physician.' "260 
2. Expert Testimony 
Although Maryland courts distinguish between treating and ex-
amining physicians, a practitioner can undermine the distinction's 
value through the effective use of expert testimony.261 By qualifYing 
an examining physician as an expert in a field related to the pa-
tient's injury, practitioners can effectively present otherwise inadmis-
sible hearsay evidence.262 
Experts qualified to offer opinion testimony263 receive relatively 
tional circumstances."); Chasanow & Anderson, supra note 254, at 25 (noting 
that the "Maryland residual [hearsay] exceptions are more restrictive than 
their federal counterparts."). However, federal courts may be more likely to 
admit evidence under this hearsay exception. Compare S. Rep. No. 93-1277, at 
20 (1974) (declaring that the residual hearsay exception be used "very rarely, 
and only in exceptional circumstances."), with United States v. American Cy-
anamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859, 866 (S.D.N.Y 1977) (failing to find a require-
ment that the hearsay exception is only applicable if extraordinary circum-
stances exist). 
260. Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 28, 536 A.2d 666, 679 (1988) (correlating the 
trustworthiness of a patient's statement to his need and desire for treatment 
and care) (citing Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 277 Md. 120, 124, 353 
A.2d 263, 265 (1976». 
261. See Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 328-29, 368 A.2d 1005, 1009-10 (1977). Of 
interest is the court's recognition that the physician could testify as to the 
physician'S conclusions based on subjective symptoms for limited purposes, 
such as to establish that the patient complained of those symptoms and that 
the doctor based the conclusions upon that information. See id. 
262. The circumstances under which one may be so qualified would likely allow a 
family practitioner, such as the one described in the introductory hypotheti-
cal, to be qualified as an expert. See MD. R EVID. 5-702 (providing the require-
ments and qualifications of an expert witness). 
263. Compare, e.g., MD. R EVID. 5-701 (restricting the use of lay opinion testimony to 
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lenient treatment from the courts.264 If carefully directed, a quali-
fied expert265 may testify as to the substance of an otherwise inad-
missible hearsay statement.266 If the expert reasonably relies267 on 
instances in which the evidence is "rationally based on the perception of the 
witness and ... helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or 
the detemlination of a fact in issue"), with MD. R. EVID. 5-702 (permitting 
opinion evidence offered by a qualified expert if the testimony will "assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue"). 
264. See, e.g., Laurel Beeler & William R. Wiebe, DNA Identification Tests and the 
Courts, 63 WASH. L. REv. 903, 934 (1988) (discussing how admissibility of scien-
tific evidence is more lenient under the Federal Rules of Evidence than under 
state rules of evidence); Beth E. Bookwalter, Throwing the Bath Water out with 
the BaITy: Wrongful Exclusion of Expert Testimony on Neonaticide Syndrome, 78 B.D. 
L. REv. 1185. 1199-1200 (1998) (discussing the lenient standard the Supreme 
Court established regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence); Susan R. 
Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution to the Problem of Cau-
sation?, 7 HIGH TECH. LJ. 189, 194 (1992) (examining why "a significant num-
ber of courts take a lenient posture toward scientific evidence"). 
265. For a traditional examining physician consulted in preparation for litigation, 
this requirement does not present a significant impediment. Under the Mary-
land Rules of Evidence: 
Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or oth-
erwise, if the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. In 
making that determination, the court shall determine (1) whether 
the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, (2) the appropriateness of the expert testi-
mony on the particular subject, and (3) whether a sufficient factual 
basis exists to support the expert testimony. 
MD. R. EVID. 5-702; accord FED. R. EVID. 702. 
266. See Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 329, 368 A.2d 1005, 1010 (1977). 
267. See MD. R. EVID. 5-703 (providing that facts "reasonably relied upon by experts 
... need not be admissible in evidence."); FED. R. EVID. 703 (same). Several 
courts, including the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Beahm, recognized this 
technique as a valid route to the admission of otherwise inadmissible evi-
dence. See Beahm, 279 Md. at 327, 368 A.2d at 1009 (holding that a doctor 
who examines a patient in order to qualify as an expert may testify to his 
medical conclusions); Maryland Dept. of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day 
Nursery, 317 Md. 573, 589, 565 A.2d 1015, 1023 (1989) (holding that a medi-
cal practitioner may recount statements made by a patient for the limited pur-
pose of explaining his expert conclusions); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. 
Nothstein, 300 Md. 667, 679-80, 480 A.2d 807, 813-14 (1984) (noting that hear-
say needed to explain the expert's basis for his opinion is admissible, but not 
as substantive evidence) (citations omitted). Cf Adam T. Berkoff, Computer 
Simulations in Litigation: Are Television Generation Jurors Being Misled? 77 MAR-
QUETIE L. REv. 829, 844 (1994) (noting the ability of evidence admitted under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 to circumvent general hearsay rules denying ad-
missibility) . 
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such hearsay evidence in forming an opinion or inference, the evi-
dence would be admissible, subject to a proper limiting instruc-
tion.26s The statement may thereby be presented to the jury as part 
of the expert's conclusion or as part of a hypothetical question 
posed by the directing attorney.269 
By requiring this limiting instruction, Maryland courts impliedly 
recognize a jury's ability to differentiate between substantive evi-
dence and evidence introduced merely to support the expert's opin-
ion.270 Although the Maryland courts assume that juries follow limit-
ing instructions,271 many notable jurists seriously question the 
effectiveness of these instructions, and the impact upon a court's 
ability to hold a fair and impartial trial.272 Notwithstanding the ques-
268. See MD. R EVID. 5-703(b) (permitting the introduction of evidence on which 
an expert in the specified field would reasonably rely, notwithstanding its in-
admissibility under other rules of evidence). 
269. See MCLAIN, supra note 52, § 2.703.4(a), at 194. Obviously, the admissibility of 
this evidence is not absolute; the court must determine "the underlying facts 
to be 'trustworthy, necessary to illuminate testimony, and unprivileged.'" Id. 
at 195. The court may also exclude evidence if it would be "unduly confusing 
to the jury or unduly, unfairly prejudicial." Id. 
270. See Beahm, 279 Md. at 327-28 n.5, 368 A.2d at 1009 n.5 (1977). Of note, how-
ever, is Maryland's refusal to generally admit hearsay statements in contempla-
tion of treatment, without permitting an opposing party to question its trust-
worthiness, and then allowing the jury to make a credibility determination. 
For a discussion of how this would be a preferable treatment, see infra Part 
IV.B. 
271. See McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 615, 375 A.2d 551, 557-58 (1977) (recog-
nizing that a court must presume that a jury will follow its instructions); Wei-
ner v. State, 55 Md. App. 548, 559, 464 A.2d 1096, 1103 (1983) (recognizing 
the legal practice of admitting evidence for a limited purpose and presuming 
that the jury will follow its instructions). Nonetheless, the McKnight and Weiner 
courts conceded to the limited utility of these instructions, concluding that 
limiting instructions could not cure the unfair prejudice created by the admis-
sion of some evidence. See McKnight, 280 Md. at 615, 375 A.2d at 557 (holding 
that the prejudice created by the unfair admission of other crimes' evidence 
could not be cured by a limiting instruction); Weiner, 55 Md. App. at 559, 464 
A.2d at 1103 (holding that the unfair admission of other crimes' evidence 
could not be cured by a limiting instruction). 
272. See McKnight, 280 Md. at 615, 375 A.2d at 557 (quoting Delli Paoli v. United 
States, 352 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting» ("The fact of the 
matter is that too often such admonition against misuse is intrinsically ineffec-
tive. "); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., con-
curring) ("The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by 
instructions to the jury ... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fic-
tion."); Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (Learned 
Hand, J.) (" [T]he recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is 
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tionable effectiveness of these instructions,273 however, the failure of 
a court to render these instructions has dire consequences under 
Maryland law.274 This tenuous difference under the common law led 
to the federal courts' abandonment of the distinction between treat-
ing and examining physicians.275 
Due to the significant restrictions placed on the residual hear-
say exception276 and the strict requirements of other alternative 
hearsay exceptions, the presentation of hearsay statements like 
those in Cassidy, Rachel T., Low, and the introductory hypothetical 
may only be entered into evidence in Maryland through expert tes-
timony. Although compelling, such evidence cannot alone sustain a 
conviction or a finding of liability because such evidence cannot be 
considered as substantive evidence.277 While the jury's ability to 
make so subtle a distinction could be questioned, the fact-finder, as 
the final arbiter of credibility, may be in a more appropriate posi-
tion to evaluate this evidence. 
B. The Fact-jinder as an Alternative Protection 
Determinations of fact are within the province of the fact-
finder, be it the jury or the presiding judge.278 Included within this 
beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else."); People v. Aranda, 63 
Cal.2d. 518, 407 P.2d 265, 272 (1965) (Traynor, CJ.) ("A jury cannot 'segre-
gate evidence into separate intellectual boxes.'"). Interestingly, this debate 
threatens the rule against hearsay itself because a jury sufficiently sophisti-
cated to make such a distinction would also be sufficiently sophisticated to 
distinguish between the credibility of hearsay statements and live testimony. 
273. See McKnight, 280 Md. at 615, 375 A.2d at 579. A jury's difficulty in distinguish-
ing between substantive evidence and evidence solely underlying an expert 
opinion is increased by the courts' challenge in differentiating between a 
treating and examining physician. For a discussion of this blurry distinction 
under Maryland case law, see supra Part III.B. 
274. See Low v. State, 119 Md. App. 413, 425, 705 A.2d 67, 73-74 (1998) (reversing a 
criminal conviction for second degree rape, second degree sexual offense, 
and child abuse due to the trial court's unlimited admission of hearsay state-
ments relayed through the testimony of an examining physician); Cassidy v. 
State, 74 Md. App. I, 49-50, 536 A.2d 666, 690 (1988) (reversing a child abuse 
and assault conviction on similar grounds). 
275. See supra note 206 for a discussion of the relevant portion of the Advisory 
Committee's note to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4). 
276. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
277. See Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 327, 368 A.2d 1005, 1010 (1977) (noting 
the limited admissibility of such evidence). However, the expert opinion 
grounded on such hearsay statements is substantive evidence and does sup-
port a jury finding. See supra notes 263-69 and accompanying text. 
278. See, e.g., Blumenthal Kahn Elec. Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
280 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 29 
fact-finding power is the responsibility of making credibility determi-
nations.279 The fact-finder is intended to be the appropriate vehicle 
for determining how trustworthy evidence really is.280 
Yet, even though a Maryland jury can determine the credibility 
of an expert where observations are reasonably based on inadmissi-
ble hearsay,281 Maryland courts have been reluctant to charge the 
jury with the responsibility of determining the credibility of the 
hearsay statements themselves. 282 A commentator advocating the 
abandonment of the rules of evidence touches upon the ultimate 
irony of the state's stance: 
Under today's rules, modern juries are asked to evaluate 
conflicting expert testimony on everything from DNA 
matching to post-traumatic stress syndrome. The idea that 
the same juries cannot handle the relatively obvious 
strengths and weaknesses of hearsay evidence is an odd 
one. . . . To claim that such problems exist means one can 
think of a hearsay statement that jurors would mishandle 
for a reason they could not appreciate, even if it were ex-
plained to them. This reflects an eighteenth-century class 
arrogance sorely out of place in today's society.283 
120 Md. App. 630, 638, 708 A.2d 1, 4-5 (1997) (describing the jury function). 
Only if there is no rational basis for the fact-finder's conclusion will an appel-
late court disturb this determination. See, e.g., Fraidin v. State, 85 Md. App. 
231, 242, 583. A.2d 1065, 1071 (1991) ("The conviction must be affirmed if, 
'after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.''') (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 
(1979» . 
279. See, e.g., Binnie v. State, 321 Md. 572, 580-81, 583 A.2d 1037, 1041 (1991) (rec-
ognizing that the determination as to a witness' reliability and credibility is a 
jury decision); Perry v. State, 234 Md. 48, 51, 197 A.2d 833, 835, 835 (1964) 
("It is axiomatic that the weights to be given to the evidence and believability 
vel non of witnesses are matters for the jury to determine.") (citing Duffin v. 
State, 229 Md. 434, 184 A.2d 624 (1962); Wright v. State, 222 Md. 242, 159 
A.2d 636 (1960); Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 146 A.2d 29 (1958»; Douglas v. 
State, 32 Md. App. 311, 316-17, 360 A.2d 474, 477 (1976) (noting assessments 
and observations of a witness' conduct and demeanor are proper and impera-
tive to the fact finding process). 
280. See, e.g., Muir v. State, 64 Md. App. 648, 654, 498 A.2d 666, 668 (1985), aff'd 
308 Md. 208, 517 A.2d 1105 (1986) (noting that the fact-finder may freely ac-
cept evidence it believes and reject that which it does not). 
281. See, e.g., Beahm, 279 Md. at 327, 368 A.2d at 1010 (citing Candella v. Subse-
quent Injury Fund, 277 Md. 120, 124, 353 A.2d 263, 266 (1976». 
282. See id. 
o 
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While this commentator and the Advisory Committee wntmg 
on Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) would disagree as to the jury's 
ability to comprehend a limiting instruction,284 neither would likely 
challenge the fact-finder's responsibility to make credibility determi-
nations.285 Therefore, if properly guided, a jury could balance the 
importance and weaknesses of an examining physician's testimony 
to determine liability or guilt.286 A properly conducted and effective 
cross-examination, in Wigmore's words, "the greatest legal engine 
ever invented for the discovery of truth,"287 would undoubtedly ex-
pose weaknesses in an examining physician's testimony.288 By al-
lowing litigants to inquire into the number of times a physician in-
teracted with a patient, whether the physician discussed the cause-
and-effect relationship between the patient's statements and subse-
quent treatment, and any measures undertaken by the physician to 
relate her ability to perform treatment to the patient would expose 
the frailties that so concerned the Cassidy and Low courts.289 
v. CONCLUSION 
The rule against hearsay provides an effective roadblock to 
those looking to fabricate evidence, escape the penalty of peIjury, 
or deprive their opponent of the right of cross-examination.290 How-
283. Milich, supra note 8, at 771-72. This Comment does not intend to argue that 
the courts' difficulty in handling the hearsay exception for statements in con-
templation of treatment demonstrates the weaknesses of the entire rule 
against hearsay. 
284. See supra note 206 for the exact language of the relevant portion of the Advi-
sory Committee note. 
285. This argument nears absurdity when one considers a judge as a fact-finder. See 
Milich, supra note 8, at 772. 
Id. 
If, despite all the learned judge knows about the potential frailties of 
hearsay in general, she concludes that it is rational and fair to accord 
some weight to specific hearsay, what justification could exist for for-
bidding this? Is there something wrong with this evidence that the 
trial judge cannot understand and factor into her evaluation? 
286. See MCLAIN, supra note 52, § 2.803.4(0), at 255 (comparing FED. R EVID. 803 
and MD. R EVID. 5-803 (b) (4». "One might add that the fact-finder is likely to 
see that self-serving statements to a non-treating, but testifying, expert are sus-
pect." Id. 
287. See WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 1367, at 32. 
288. See id. 
289. For the analysis undertaken by these courts, see supra notes 135-67 and 175-
208. 
290. See supra notes 3345 and accompanying text. 
Q 
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ever, to serve public policy initiatives, the law affords numerous ex-
ceptions to the rule against hearsay.291 An example of such an ex-
ception permits trial courts to admit hearsay statements made in 
contemplation of medical treatment. 292 Although this exception 
plays an important role in Supreme Court,293 Maryland,294 and fed-
eral court case law,295 the methods used by individual jurisdictions 
reveal a lack of unity. One point of differentiation is whether a 
court should fully admit the testimony of examining physi-
cians-traditionally defined as those consulted primarily for litiga-
tion. 296 While Maryland courts relatively adhere to the common 
law's refusal to fully admit hearsay statements to these individuals, 
recent case law has significantly muddled the definition of examin-
ing physician.297 Rather than attempting to untangle this confusion, 
Maryland should follow the lead of the federal courts by aban-
doning this arbitrary distinction.29B In doing so, Maryland courts 
would recognize the realities of the . courtroom299 and finally relin-
quish this credibility determination to its rightful owner-the fact-
finder.3°O 
David S. Gray 
291. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text. 
292. See supra notes 55-73 and accompanying text. 
293. See supra Part III.A. 
294. See supra Part III.B. 
295. See supra Part III.C. 
296. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
297. See supra Part III.B. 
298. See supra Part III.C. 
299. See supra Part IV.A. 
300. See supra Part IV.B. 
